The health and wellbeing of our community is based on a mutual
understanding that we are in this together - whether the audience is our
customers, the physicians who provide care, our agent and brokers, or the
alliance partners with whom we collaborate to provide practical, caring
solutions. With them we share competencies, capabilities and knowledge
for mutual wins.
We are committed to achieving shared value through trusted relationships.

BlueCross BlueShield
of Florida
An Independent Licensee ol the
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida
P.O. Box 1798
Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0014

The health and well-being of our community is based on a mutual understanding that
we are in this together - whether the audience is our customers, the physicians who
provide care, our agent and brokers, or the alliance partners with whom we collaborate
to provide practical, caring solutions. With them we share competencies, capabilities
and knowledge for mutual wins.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida's (BCBSF's) Alliance Management program puts
solid alliance business practices and disciplines into action to achieve shared value
through trusted relationships.
Both our partners and colleagues are empowered with the tools and backing to make the
most out of partnerships. Combining this intellectual capital with a focus on results
yields powerful relationships that deliver value to all involved parties.
Our existing alliances received seven national awards and two regional awards for
innovation, partnering capabilities and solutions. In addition,
•
•
•
•

100% of alliance partners from organizations outside of BCBSF agree or strongly
agree that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is a desirable partner of choice. Of
these respondents, 85% strongly agree with the statement.
Eight alliances reported against annual revenues with a positive impact of $.'359
million in 2004.
Two alliances tracking financial conservation - savings achieved by delivering a
business process and/ or service through an alliance relationship-reported savings of
more than $6 million in 2004.
BCBSF recently was honored with the 2005 Overall Management Excellence Award
presented by the Association of Strategic Alliance Professionals (ASAP) at its 7th
Global Alliance Summit.

We've enclosed a sample of articles, which also speak to our work in the practice of
Alliance Management. We're proud of the work that we've accomplished and we are
excited about the work we have ahead.
To find out more about what you read we invite you to contact us so that we can discuss
the material in person. In the meantime, find out what the Gartner Group, Harvard
Business Review and the Academy of Management Executive say about our work.
These and others are included in the material we've enclosed.
Renee Finley
Enterprise Alliance Management Group

Alliance Management Produces More
Successful Outcomes
GartnerG2 Case Study TS-CAS-0904-0004, September 2004

Situation
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBSF)
provides health benefit plans and health-related
services to its members. The company and its
subsidiaries serve more than 6 million Floridians.
However, maintaining a market leadership position is
difficult in light of the many challenges facing today's
healthcare marketplace. Rising healthcare costs,
increased competition, legislation, consumerism and
shifting demographics sent the company searching
for new and different ways of doing business, as
customers' healthcare needs and expectations
expand.
Developing alliances is one way the company is
positioning itself for the future. Currently, BCBSF has
approximately 40 alliance relationships, which are
defined as a collaborative relationship between
entities that share the risk and reward of pursuing
mutually compatible goals that are difficult to achieve
alone.
Alliances may include outsourcing partnerships, joint
operating agreements or joint ventures. These
relationships provide BCBSF and its partners access
to new markets, capabilities, knowledge and capital,
along with the ability to share development and
acquisition costs and risks. Alliances also help each
partner bring products or services to market quickly
in a cost-effective manner, which is critical in today's
healthcare industry.
However, successful alliances - those that meet
stated business objectives and return targets - are
difficult to achieve. The majority of alliances fail to
meet expectations for two significant reasons:
• Shifts in internal business strategies.
• A lack of senior management focus.
Organizations considering alliances and those
already involved in alliances benefit from a
programmed, disciplined approach to alliance

Issue/Solution

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBSF)
wanted to maximize the effectiveness of multiple,
dynamic alliances.
By developing a methodical approach to forming and
managing alliances, it increased the likelihood of meet
ing business goals.

Situation

• Rising healthcare costs, increased competition, leg
islation and consumerism demand new and different
ways of doing business.
• Developing alliances with other organizations is one
way BCBSF is positioning itself for the health indus
try of the future.
• Alliances that meet business objective targets are
difficult to achieve and sustain without a pro
grammed, disciplined approach.

Discoveries

• Before the Enterprise Alliance Management Initiative,
BCBSF's alliances had varying styles and operating
philosophies.
• Benchmarking research helped BCBSF cultivate
best practices and incorporate them into a cus
tomized alliance program.
• Measuring alliance performance allows BCBSF to
achieve desired outcomes, monitor progress, and
recognize and reward success.

Recommendations

• Create a dedicated team specializing in the disci
pline of alliance management to help successfully
manage alliances.
• Develop a well-rounded program with a variety of
user-friendly options for learning about alliance man
agement.
• Designate an individual for each alliance whose role
explicitly includes alliance management, and meas
ure performance.

Dig Deeper
•
•
•
•

Related Research from GartnerG2
Gartner Core Research
Outside Sources
Methodology

GartnerlG2

management. Developing an alliance capability
includes equipping the organization with the skills
and tools to maximize success, learning about
alliance management and leveraging knowledge
within the company. BCBSF increased success rates
by investing in alliance training, alliance specialists
and alliance evaluation.
BCBSF established an Enterprise Alliance
Management Initiative to institutionalize its alliance
capability. The initiative included the formation in
2001 of the Enterprise Alliance Management Group
to help BCBSF's business sectors develop strategic
relationships with other entities through a
programmed, disciplined approach. This approach
enables the company's business areas to
successfully form, manage and transform alliances.
It also makes it possible for the company to assess
the performance of its entire alliance portfolio.
BCBSF found that essential components of
successful alliances include a defined approach to
performance management that begins with strategic
planning and alignment, and must also include
annual goals and performance metrics specific to the
alliance.

Discoveries
Before establishing the Enterprise Alliance
Management Initiative, BCBSF had several alliances
with varying management styles and operating
philosophies. Business units within the company
responsible for managing alliances did not employ a
consistent approach for developing and managing
these relationships. In light of the estimated failure
rate of alliances, the company realized it could
maximize the effectiveness of its alliances by
providing business units with standardized
methodologies, tools and resources. The Enterprise
Alliance Management Group was formed to provide
those tools and resources.

Creating guidelines and a framework
The first step was to create an alliance management
framework and engagement guidelines for evaluating
all business arrangements with external partners. A
decision-making tool was developed to guide
individuals and groups through the process of
determining whether it is best to build, buy or ally.
The tool features evaluation criteria and a decision
matrix that can be used to analyze the best option.
BCBSF divides its capabilities into three categories:
core assets, mission-critical activities and non-core
assets. Non-core assets are generally considered
most suitable for outsourcing partnerships. Mission
critical activities are considered for alliances only
after thorough deliberation on whether to build, buy or
ally. Core assets are not usually considered for
alliances.
If an alliance is the best option for an opportunity or
capability, BCBSF follows an alliance framework,
which contains specific activities, tasks and tools for
each stage of alliance management (see Figure 1 ).
Stages include planning, exploring and evaluating,
negotiating, structuring, managing and, if needed,
transforming.
The Enterprise Alliance Management Group provides
assistance with a variety of tasks, including
identifying partnering opportunities, selecting
appropriate partners, facilitating the launch of a new
alliance, assisting with audit activities, and helping to
analyze termination or decisions to renegotiate. For
example, the group offers a tool to facilitate partner
selection that assesses partners in three dimensions:
strategic, operational and cultural.

Moving from theory to action
Within each alliance, one individual from the
respective business area has alliance manager
accountabilities. Responsibilities include overseeing

© 2005 Gartner, Inc. and/or its Affiliates. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this publication in any form without prior written permis
sion is forbidden. The information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable. Gartner disclaims all war
ranties as to the accuracy, completeness or adequacy of such information. Gartner shall have no liability for errors, omissions or inad
equacies in the information contained herein or for interpretations thereof. The reader assumes sole responsibility for the selection of
these materials to achieve its intended results. The opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice.
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Figure 1: Individual alliance and portfolio framework
Results
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Source: BCBSF and Vantage Partners, September 2004

the day-to-day management of the relationship and
championing the alliance's best interests. Alliance
managers throughout the company get support
services from the Enterprise Alliance Management
Program. Services include one-on-one consultations,
workshops and self-help tools to help manage
alliances.
For example, the alliance management portal
provides access through an internal Web site to a
variety of tools and consulting information, such as
training opportunities, links to alliance resources and
current news about the latest developments in
alliance management. The site also offers the
Strategic Alliance Best Practice User Guide, which
provides step-by-step information to help in forming,
managing and evolving key business relationships.
The guide is also available in hard copy. Information
on the site, like the consulting services, is the result
of years of experience, analysis of successes and
failures, and surveys of the most profitable

approaches used by the country's top alliance
experts.
After having researched the alliance market for best
practices and insights, BCBSF is further refining and
enhancing its alliance management capabilities by
working with Vantage Partners. Vantage Partners is a
consulting firm that specializes in helping companies
institutionalize the capability to effectively negotiate,
build and manage critical relationships.
Soon, users will be able to access a variety of
alliance reference documents through the alliance
management portal. The company recognized that
creating a centralized point of access and storage for
alliance and partner profiles, as well as key
documents and performance indicators would
increase knowledge management across the
enterprise. BCBSF is also working with Vantage
Technologies, the software division of Vantage
Partners, to customize and implement a Web-based
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capability to capture, store and report alliance
activities across the various business areas. BCBSF
is currently piloting six alliances through this
software, and plans to implement the capability
throughout the organization by the end of 2004. In
addition, BCBSF is seeking to expand these
capabilities to include selective, shared access with
its alliance partners.
Another self-help capability and learning resource for
those managing alliances is the Community of
Practice. The Community of Practice is an informal
group of alliance practitioners and key enablers from
across the organization who work together to
compare, validate and disseminate alliance
management best practices. As a result of these
engagements, participants may harness the
collective efforts around the organization to help
deliver greater value from alliances.
The vision for the Community of Practice is to be a
self-governed group that meets regularly. Meetings
include educational sessions and facilitated
workshops where members work together to
produce solutions for common issues or
opportunities. A unique feature of the meetings is
that they are open to external alliance partners.

Measuring performance
One significant advantage of having a formal
methodology for alliance management is the toolset
provided to alliance managers for performance
measurement. Monitoring progress helps in
recognizing problems early, facilitates problem
diagnosis and corrective action, and recognizes and
rewards success.
The basis for measuring performance begins with a
business plan defining the market opportunity,
product or service, sales and promotional approach,
and financial forecasts. This is critical in setting the
stage for alignment with corporate goals. In addition,
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each partner should agree early on what it will
contribute in terms of capital, resources and revenue.
This business plan provides initial direction in
performance measurement activities.
At BCBSF, alliance performance is measured in four
areas:
• Alliance performance metrics, which measure
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the targeted results of individual alliances.
· Enterprise alliance value metrics, which
demonstrate the degree to which each alliance
adds value (high, medium or low) to each of the
company's seven corporate objectives. These
were created to help the company determine if
and how alliances are contributing to the overall
success of the enterprise.
• Alliance management program effectiveness,
which allows internal stakeholders and alliance
partners to measure the effectiveness of the
company's alliance program. In effect, this
measures customer satisfaction. It is an extremely
helpful tool for engaging alliance managers more
directly in the program by allowing them to rate
current services and provide input on the
program's future direction. Through online, oral
and written surveys, the Enterprise Alliance
Management Group uses feedback from alliance
managers and other key stakeholders to enhance
and fine-tune the program. It also helps assess
the company's progress toward developing
alliance capabilities.
· Array of enterprise alliances, which measures
the success and health of the alliances as a
collection overall. Successful alliance
management is not only a function of individual
alliances, but also involves effective design and
management of a company's entire set of
alliances. Through its array of enterprise alliances
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measurement, the company is moving toward
looking at all of its alliances as an aggregated
whole. This helps the company determine
synergies among organizations, and identify and
reduce constraints among alliances. It also helps
identify opportunities for balancing the array of
business relationships so it is not overly
concentrated on one type of alliance or one sub
market of the health industry.
Of the four areas, alliance performance metrics is
the most mature. Members of the Enterprise Alliance
Management Group work with alliance managers to
develop customized scorecards that provide a
variety of metrics on the performance of each
alliance. Metrics are unique to each alliance and are
derived through collaboration with alliance partners
to define shared goals and expected outcomes.
Three areas are scored: strategic growth potential,
operational performance and relationship

management. Relationship deterioration is a leading
cause of alliance failure, so measuring the health of
the alliance relationship is critical. However, strength
in all three areas is necessary for an alliance to
reach its full potential. Each metric is compared as a
percentage of the goal, so all partners can easily see
which areas need improvement.
For example, two alliances the Enterprise Alliance
Management Program supports have resulted in
year-to-date (January through July 2004) capital
conservation of approximately $6 million. The
Enterprise Alliance Management Group facilitated a
workshop for BCBSF representatives and
representatives from the alliance partner to jointly
develop performance metrics. Through these
performance metrics, the alliance identified areas to
strengthen value delivery and initiated corrective
actions (see Table 1 ).

Table 1: Performance metrics for alliances
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Strategic Growth
• Financial return from alliance (revenue, profit, capital conservation, unit cost reduction)
• Number of new customers
• Number of cross-sell customers
• Number of new markets accessed
• Number of new capabilities, products or services deployed in marketplace
• Number of new solutions deployed in marketplace
Operational
• Alliance use of new physical assets and intellectual property
• New contacts and relationships established through partnerships
• Business process improvements learned from partner
• Performance improvements gained through alliances (reduced error rates, development
time, lead conversion to sales rate, average length of sales cycle)
• Enhanced capacity and scalability
Relationship
• Health and quality of relationship (quality of communications, decision-making, conflict
resolution, mutual gains negotiation, joint problem-solving, level of trust)
• Alignment to strategic vision
• Level of senior management support
Source: BCBSF and Vantage Partners, September 2004
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Figure 2: Enterprise alliance management program timeline
hs l ___ 12 months
� _ _
_
• Establish vision
for BCBSF as an
alliance partner
of choice.

\ �---\

• Gain executive
alignment to vision.

• Determine strategy
for achieving vision.

• Benchmark external
"best practices."
• Establish standard
alliance formation
and management
framework and
toolkit.

• Establish dedicated
Enterprise Alliance
Management Group.

12 months

..,A
r•__
"
Integrate relationship
management
activities and tools
into alliance
framework.

• Initiate training and
consulting.

• Begin development
of additional
technical capabilities
supporting alliance
management.

!

--

B months __�
.._ _

• Enhance and add
to toolset.

• Develop enterprise
alliance portfolio
governance.

• Establish Community
of Practice.

• Regularly conduct
assessments of
alliances and alliance
capabilities.

Source: BCBSF and Vantage Partners, September 2004

Implementation timeline
Creating a structure that will facilitate the
development of successful alliances takes time and
committed resources. Figure 2 shows the timeline for
establishing the enterprise alliance management
program at BCBSF.

consultants, alliance practitioners within the
business areas and training. The Enterprise
Alliance Management Group periodically engages
staff internal to BCBSF as well as external subject
matter experts for supplemental support, external
perspectives and co-development of capabilities.

Recommendations
· Create a dedicated team specializing in the
discipline of alliance management. Any firm
whose growth strategy includes alliances needs to
have positions committed to create and maintain
an alliance management program. The team does
not need to be large, but must be structured in a
way that helps others throughout the organization
successfully manage alliances. It is impractical for
most organizations to fund large departments of
alliance specialists. However, by creating a small,
dedicated team that teaches others the discipline
of alliances through consulting and self-help tools,
the capability for successful alliance management
can be instituted throughout an organization in a
cost-effective way. This will allow others in the
organization to develop the competencies they
need to manage alliances successfully. BCBSF
has committed funds for dedicated resources in
the Enterprise Alliance Management Group,

• Develop a well-rounded program with a variety
of user-friendly options for learning about
alliance management. This includes self-help
tools, face-to-face consulting and workshops.
Training materials, tools and information should be
designed in a way that will allow others to develop
alliance management capabilities of their own.
Provide opportunities to learn from other internal
and external alliance practitioners. Make sure
information is easily accessible, practical, easy to
understand and use, and offered in a range of
media. Individual tools can be used in isolation,
but using complementary components delivers the
greatest value. Offering a variety of tools through
various media helps alliance managers with
diverse learning styles develop competencies to
manage alliances successfully. In addition, when
alliance partners share tools with each o!her, it
facilitates understanding, communications and
alignment. BCBSF shares tools with other Blue
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Cross Blue Shield plans and with their alliance
partners.
· Designate an individual for each alliance
whose role explicitly includes alliance
management. Each alliance should have an
alliance manager responsible for keeping the best
interests of the alliance in the forefront. This
person is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the relationship and championing
the best interests of the alliance. This doesn't
necessarily need to be a dedicated position, but
alliance management should be part of an explicit
item in the individual's job description.
· Measure performance. It is important to evaluate
the performance of each alliance in a collaborative
manner with input from all alliance partners and
other key stakeholders. Partners should take an
active role in developing performance metrics, a
relationship scorecard and assessing progress
toward goals.
· Lead the change. It is not enough simply to
create a dedicated team for alliance management.
The team must be a proactive proponent for

change throughout the organization. That is
necessary for building an environment and
business processes in which alliances can
succeed. The alliance program requires strong
senior leadership commitment and support in
championing alliances and the alliance
management discipline. Traditional "turf-protection"
mindsets can destroy an alliance, if allowed to
continue.Alliances work best when each partner
works to understand the other's underlying
interests. The alliance program must be proactive
and deliberate in establishing collaborative
behaviors among alliance practitioners.
- Work to modify traditional recognition and
reward systems so they recognize alliance
success.
- Establish relationship management training and
tools that are focused on mutual gains
negotiations, managing conflict, dealing with
difficult conversations, and understanding
others' interests and perspectives.
Incorporate "build, buy or ally" options into
enterprise program management and project
management methodologies.
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Dig Deeper
Related Research from GartnerG2
Sourcing: A Growth Prescription for Pharmaceuticals
and Biotech
By Carol Rozwell (18 March 2002)
http://www. gartnerg2. com/rpt/rpt-0302-0044. asp
Sourcing: How to Evaluate Your Readiness to Make
a Commitment
By Carol Rozwell (02 April 2002)
http://www.gartnerg2.com/rpt/rpt-0402-0055.asp

Gartner Core Research
2003-2004 Alliance Best Practices: Top Five Issues
By Christine Adams (03 February 2004) cas-09040004-1 1 9345. pdf
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Summary: Having the right partners-and the right
partnering practices-commands the attention of IT
alliance builders. Industry standards are emerging.

Outside Sources
BCBSF Web site (http://www.bcbsfl.com/)
Vantage Partners Web site
(http://www.vantagepartners.com)
Methodology
Information for this case study is derived from
detailed GartnerG2 discussions with senior managers
of BCBSF: Bridget Booth, principal in the Enterprise
Alliance Management Group; Matt Mccredie,
Enterprise Alliance Management consultant; and
Renee Finley, principal in the Enterprise Alliance
Management Group. Background information and
insights are drawn from the industry knowledge and
experience of the authors.
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10 Healthcare Predictions For 2005

with Bradford J. Holmes, Lynne"Sam"Bishop, Eric G. Brown, Katy Henrickson, and Laura Ramos

Healthcare IT has moved off the back burner as healthcare organizations respond to rising demands
around runaway costs, uncertain quality, and opaque value from every constituent they serve. Here are
Forrester's top predictions of what healthcare companies and the vendors that support them will do and
experience in 2005 in response to markets pressing for progress.
HE

T

Tr

Healthcare was hot in 2004 with the rollout of the Medicare reform legislation, the appointment
of a national healthcare IT coordinator, M&A activity in the health plan sector, the high-profile
withdrawal of a major pharmaceutical blockbuster, and consumer-driven insurance products stoking
the fire. What changes does 2005 hold for healthcare organizations and the technologies they deploy?
Forrester predicts that:
1. Pay-for-performance (P4P) will take off in health plan network contracts. In an effort to
spread evidence-based clinical best practices and control medical costs, pioneering health plans
have instituted P4P programs to reward hospitals that score well on negotiated quality measures.
According to The Leapfrog Group's Incentive & Reward Compendium, there are approximately
20 financial incentive programs in place between health plans and hospitals today - out of
approximately 350 commercial health plans in the US. Why not more? Hospitals and plans don't
see eye-to-eye on which quality measures to use. But as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services' (CMS') National Voluntary Hospital Reporting Initiative (NVHRI) gains momentum,
hospitals will be more willing to report these standard quality measures, and plans will use the
data to kick-start P4P negotiations. Forrester expects the number of plans with hospital P4P
programs to more than double in 2005.
2. Blues plans will pool their IT ventures. In the aftermath of eHealth's go-go years, survivors
Availity, NaviMedix, and RealMed - all heavily backed by Blue Cross Blue Shield plans - are
enjoying regional success providing c9nnectivity between care providers and Blues plans. To
grow these ventures beyond their captive Blues clients and into the larger national market,
Forrester expects their patrons - plans like Highmark BCBS, BCBS of Florida, and Health Care
Service Corporation (HCSC) - to explore ways to roll the products together. By year's end, look
for the creation of an arm's-length subsidiary, akin to UnitedHealthcare's Ingenix, jointly owned
by Blues plans and ready to sell provider portal services to insurers of any color.
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3. Despite FDA coaxing, lack of ROI will stifle RFID drug pedigree progress. Pushing
to secure the US prescription drug supply chain, the FDA cleared the way in November
for radio frequency identification (RFID) as the key technology for antitheft and anti
counterfeit pilots. While GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, and Purdue
Pharma threw their hats in the ring, Forrester predicts that the cost and immaturity
of this nascent technology will limit activity to small-scale experimentation only.
Expect no more than half a dozen major pilots in 2005 - none of the size that would
test RFID effectiveness across the entire product portfolio - as most top-SO pharma
firms watch from the sidelines and wait for a solid business case to surface. Barring a
high-profile drug safety scare (think Tylenol in the '80s), the FDA working group's only
influence in 2005 will come from sustaining a PR campaign promoting RFID for drug
safety and - more subtly - discouraging reimportation.
4. Medicare drug discount cards won't entice 80% of eligible seniors. The first phase
of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 provides Medicare-eligible
consumers access to discount drug card memberships. The program, a stopgap until the
full prescription benefit takes effect in 2006, has attracted only 5.8 million enrollees out
of a total eligible population of about 4 1 million - and nearly half of current discount
card holders were automatically enrolled by their supplemental insurance carrier. 1 The
majority of US seniors still struggle to differentiate dozens of competing card programs
- each with varying discount levels, covered drugs, and pharmacy networks. Forrester
expects that card vendors will continue to miss the mark with seniors, meaning that
Medicare discount card enrollment will creep to slightly more than 8 million by the
end of 2005 - a total participation rate of barely 20% of Medicare beneficiaries.
5. Forty-four percent of online commercial plan members will visit health plan
sites. In the coming year, large health insurers will continue to drive members toward
self-service - directing them to the Net for benefits-related content and self-service
transactions like claims status lookup. Bolstered by this push and their own growing
online experience, commercially insured consumers will increasingly expect insurers'
Web sites to provide answers to their plan-related questions. Forrester predicts that
44% of online health plan members will visit their insurer's site in 2005, up from 34%
in 2004 - a 30% jump (see Figure 1 ) . But members won't consistently turn to the Web
as their first line of service - and consumer-directed health plan (CDHP) enrollment
won't take off - until 2006, when plans do a better job providing digestible, provider
quality information, usable online decision support tools, and ready access to financial
information like deductibles and FSA or HSA balances. 2
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Figure 1
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Health Plan Members' Site Visits Wil l I ncrease By 30% From 2004 To 2005
50%
40%
Percent of online plan
mem bers visiting their
i nsurer's Web site

30%
20%
1 0%

*Source: Forrester's Consu mer Technog raphics• 2003 North American Benchmark Study
tSource: Forrester's Consumer Technographics 2004 North American Benchmark Study
Source: Forrester Research, Inc.

6. Pharma's eDetailing initiatives will reach a plateau. In response to physicians'
mounting reluctance to spend valuable office time with drug sales reps, pharma firms
have sought new, often electronic, means of maintaining their share of voice with top
prescribers. One of the most successful of these tactics is eDetailing, inviting a target
group of physicians to participate in an electronic marketing session. Drug firms
spent 2004 expanding the breadth of their eDetailing initiatives to encompass a greater
number of the drugs in their portfolio. The result? Top prescribers - particularly
family practitioners, internists, and ob/gyns - today are inundated with email
invitations for eDetails. Forrester expects that in 2005, the number of eDetails each
high prescriber completes will flatten if not decline as the novelty of the medium wears
off. Does this spell the death of eDetailing vendors like Lathian Systems, Medsite,
and Physicians Interactive? Not a chance. Vendors will make up for frequency
shortfalls among high prescribers by increasing their recruiting efforts among midtier
prescribers and allied health professionals like nurse practitioners, physician assistants,
and pharmacists. They'll increase their total reach - and charge pharma firms for
ready access to a larger base of prescribers and influencers.
7. Philips Medical Systems will expand its clinical IT portfolio. The strategic relationship
between Philips and Epic Systems, forged at the close of 2003, allows the medical
imaging vendor to match the "digital hospital" positioning of healthcare interstructure
competitors GE Healthcare and Siemens Medical Solutions. But consolidation among
healthcare providers - and their inclusion of previously isolated physician practices
- is driving Philips' hospital IT competitors to add practice management and electronic
medical records (EMR) systems for small and midsize physician groups to their
offerings. While Philips sat idle, GE scooped up Millbrook and MedicaLogic, and Cerner
recently picked off VitalWorks - a missed opportunity for Philips as the combination
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of VitalWorks' AMICAS medical imaging software and Philips' core apps would have
greatly boosted the vendor's market clout. The Cerner deal will light a fire under Philips,
forcing it to move quickly in 2005 before the valuations of targets like A4 Health Systems,
Greenway Medical Technologies, NextGen Healthcare Information Systems, and
Physician Micro Systems are driven up and out of reach by rising physician adoption of
EMRs - and before Siemens or McKesson get there.
8. Large banks will acquire debit card vendors to round out their HSA portfolios.
The Medicare Modernization Act, which enables tax-advantaged health savings accounts
(HSAs) for consumers in high-deductible plans, prompted large, brand-name banks
like JPMorgan Chase, Mellon, and Wells Fargo to launch HSA custodial services. To
make their HSA ventures pay, big banks will need to expand their services mix beyond
mere asset management to include transaction processing - at least until HSAs gain
sufficient traction to command a significant asset base. Meanwhile, specialized debit
card vendors like Cardtronic, Evolution Benefits, MBI, and Motivano, have developed
tools to tie together HSA transactions across plans, PBMs, and banks. In 2005,
Forrester expects aggressive HSA bankers like Mellon and JPMorgan Chase to acquire
HSA debit card upstarts that have established attractive transaction processing services.
9. Medicare's chronic care improvement projects will woo startups - but not IDNs.
The Medicare Modernization Act calls for demonstration projects in chronic care
improvement to begin in 2005. The projects - funded by CMS - will seek to prove
that disease management services can help patients with congestive heart failure
(CHF), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and diabetes to adhere to
evidence-based medicine treatment protocols. The catch for firms that lobby to be
one of the project's guinea pig vendors? Payment is "contingent on improvements in
quality:' Although project participation is open to disease management firms, insurers,
integrated delivery networks (IDNs), and physician group practices, Forrester expects
that most applications will come from disease management firms like American
Healthways, CorSolutions, and Health Dialog, as well as from emerging healthcare
unbound solution providers like CyberNet Medical and HomMed. 3 Why? Because
those "improvements in quality" equate to decreases in services consumed - and those
service reductions come straight off the top lines of IDNs and physician group practices.
10. Doctors will fall further behind the industry drive toward automation. Doctors
- particularly those younger than 43 - are not technology laggards individually,
but the smaller medical practices that dominate the frontlines of healthcare delivery
in the US are technology backwaters compared with the large payers to which they need
to connect. 4 Today, only about a quarter maintain any part of their medical records
electronically and are able to track their clinical processes, outcomes, and quality in
an efficient and reliable way. And resistance to change comes in the most visceral form
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because money spent on IT by a two-person practice takes bread from the mouths of
the families that are dependent on these small businesses. What will it take to bring
about faster physician practice adoption of clinical IT - to reduce errors, improve
quality, and satisfy plan P4P contracts? Forrester does not expect CMS or private plans
to offer major funding support across broad market swaths in 2005, but we do foresee
the stick being applied to recalcitrant doctors in a closed health system or in small
regional markets. Look for plans in a market like Boston or Minneapolis, or a CMS
pilot in a location like Phoenix, to raise eyebrows with tough payment penalties - or
program exclusion - for providers who do not have the data infrastructure needed to
meet these payers' demands for evidence of value in their care delivery.

1

Source: The Heritage Foundation, "The Progress Of The Medicare Drug Discount Card;'
December 1 , 2004, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services Web site: Statistics and Data.

2

CDHP product share will approach 7% by 2007. The last consumer-friendly innovation to hit
the health benefits market, point-of-service (POS) plans grew from zero members to 25% of the
market in about 10 years, with the bulk of the enrollment gains happening in the middle five
years. CDHP products will follow a similar trajectory. See the July 22, 2003, Brief "Consumer
Directed Health Plan Leaders Poised For Growth:'

3

Technologies in, on, and around the body that free care from formal institutions - what
Forrester calls healthcare unbound - have moved beyond the lab and are vying to enter the
mass market. Combine baby boomers caring for aging parents, and beginning to face age-related
conditions themselves, with a growing base of technology and network infrastructure on which
to build remote healthcare communication, and it seems the ideal moment for massive market
growth. But healthcare unbound will not provide an immediate or easy win for vendors. The true
potential of healthcare unbound will not be realized until third-party payers - especially CMS
- see the evidence they need to justify reimbursing technologies and services that break the mold
of traditional healthcare payment models. As a result, Forrester projects that healthcare unbound
will struggle to top $5 billion by 2010, but will skyrocket to $34 billion by 20 15. See the July 8, 2004,
Forrester Big Idea "Who Pays For Healthcare Unbound:'

4

Physicians remain more aggressive users of the Internet than other US consumers, with 87% of all
doctors going online at least monthly. But it's the younger physicians who are leading the charge,
armed with many more PDAs than their older peers and availing themselves of the Internet as a
tool for general research and a source of specific drug and medical device information. See the
August 24, 2004, Quick Take "The Next Generation Of Wired Physicians:'
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The questfor harmony and common goals can actually obstruct
teamwork. Managers get truly effective collaboration only when they
realize that conflict is natural and necessary.

Want Collaboration?
Accept-and Actively Manage-Conflict
by Jeff Weiss a nd J onath a n H ug hes

The challenge is a long-standing one for senior
managers: How do you get people in your or
ganization to work together across internal
boundaries? But the question has taken on ur
gency in today's global and fast-changing busi
ness environment. To service multinational
accounts, you increasingly need seamless col
laboration across geographic boundaries. To
improve customer satisfaction, you increas
ingly need collaboration among functions
ranging from R&D to distribution. To offer so
lutions tailored to customers' needs, you in
creasingly need collaboration between prod
uct and service groups.
Meanwhile, as competitive pressures contin
ually force companies to find ways to do more
with less, few managers have the luxury of re
lying on their own dedicated staffs to accom
plish their objectives. Instead, most must work
with and through people across the organiza
tion, many of whom have different priorities,
incentives, and ways of doing things.
Getting collaboration right promises tre
mendous benefits: a unified face to customers,
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faster internal decision making, reduced costs
through shared resources, and the develop
ment of more innovative products. But despite
the billions of dollars spent on initiatives to im
prove collaboration, few companies are happy
with the results. Time and again we have seen
management teams employ the same few
strategies to boost internal cooperation. They
restructure their organizations and reengineer
their business processes. They create cross-unit
incentives. They offer teamwork training.
While such initiatives yield the occasional suc
cess story, most of them have only limited im
pact in dismantling organizational silos and
fostering collaboration-and many are total
failures. (See the sidebar "The Three Myths of
Collaboration:')
So what's the problem? Most companies re
spond to the challenge of improving collabora
tion in entirely the wrong way. They focus on
the symptoms ("Sales and delivery do not
work together as closely as they should")
rather than on the root cause of failures in co
operation: conflict. The fact is, you can't im-
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prove collaboration until you've addressed the
issue of conflict.
This can come as a surprise to even the most
experienced executives, who generally don't
fully appreciate the inevitability of conflict in
complex organizations. And even if they do
recognize this, many mistakenly assume that
efforts to increase collaboration will signifi
cantly reduce that conflict, when in fact some
of these efforts-for example, restructuring in
itiatives-actually produce more of it
Executives underestimate not only the inev
itability of conflict but also-and this is key
its importance to the organization. The dis
agreements sparked by differences in perspec
tive, competencies, access to information, and
strategic focus within a company actually gen
erate much of the value that can come from
collaboration across organizational bound
aries. Clashes between parties are the crucibles
in which creative solutions are developed and
wise trade-offs among competing objectives
are made. So instead of trying simply to reduce
disagreements, senior executives need to em
brace conflict and, just as important, institu
tionalize mechanisms for managing it
Even though most people lack an innate un
derstanding of how to deal with conflict effec
tively, there are a number of straightforward
ways that executives can help their people
and their organizations-constructively man
age it These can be divided into two main ar
eas: strategies for managing disagreements at
the point of conflict and strategies for manag
ing conflict upon escalation up the manage
ment chain. These methods can help a com
pany move through the conflict that is a
necessary precursor to truly effective collabo
ration and, more important, extract the value
that often lies latent in intra-organizational dif
ferences. When companies are able to do both,
conflict is transformed from a major liability
into a significant asset
Strateg ies for Managing
Disag reements at the Poi nt of
Conflict

Conflict management works best when the par
ties involved in a disagreement are equipped to
manage it themselves. The aim is to get people
to resolve issues on their own through a process
that improves-or at least does not damage
their relationships. The following strategies
help produce decisions that are better in-

formed and more likely to be implemented.
Devise and implement a common method
for resolving conflict. Consider for a moment
the hypothetical Matrix Corporation, a com
posite of many organizations we've worked
with whose challenges will likely be familiar
to managers. Over the past few years, sales
people from nearly a dozen of Matrix's prod
uct and service groups have been called on to
design and sell integrated solutions to their
customers. For any given sale, five or more
lead salespeople and their teams have to agree
on issues of resource allocation, solution de
sign, pricing, and sales strategy. Not surpris
ingly, the teams are finding this difficult Who
should contribute the most resources to a par
ticular customer's offering? Who should re
duce the scope of their participation or dis
count their pricing to meet a customer's
budget? Who should defer when disagree
ments arise about account strategy? Who
should manage key relationships within the
customer account? Indeed, given these thorny
questions, Matrix is finding that a single large
sale typically generates far more conflict inside
the company than it does with the customer.
The resulting wasted time and damaged rela
tionships among sales teams are making it in
creasingly difficult to close sales.
Most companies face similar sorts of prob
lems. And, like Matrix, they leave employees
to find their own ways of resolving them. But
without a structured method for dealing with
these issues, people get bogged down not
only in what the right result should be but
also in how to arrive at it Often, they will
avoid or work around conflict, thereby forgo
ing important opportunities to collaborate.
And when people do decide to confront their
differences, they usually default to the ap
proach they know best debating about who's
right and who's wrong or haggling over small
concessions. Among the negative conse
quences of such approaches are suboptimal,
"split-the-difference" resolutions-if not out
right deadlock.
Establishing a companywide process for re
solving disagreements can alter this familiar
scenario. At the very least, a well-defined, well
designed conflict resolution method will re
duce transaction costs, such as wasted time and
the accumulation of ill will, that often come
with the struggle to work though differences.
At best, it will yield the innovative outcomes
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW • MARCH 2005

Harv
a rtic
with
a sel,

to hE
the <

ReviE
threi
over
pers1

To (
For r
OnP,

to H
Cal l :
Go t,
For <
of re

Revit
Cal l I

61 7or e
ftam

Want Col laboration?

The Three Myths of Collaboration
Com pa n i es attempt to foster col l aboration a mong different pa rts of thei r o rg a n i zations th rou g h a variety of methods, m a ny based on
a n u m be r of see m i n g ly sensible but u lti mately misgu ided assu m ptions:

Effective collaboration means
"teaming?'

An effective incentive system will
ensure collaboration.

Organizations can be structured
for collaboration.

Many com pa nies think that tea mwork
tra i n i ng is the way to promote col l abora
tion across an organization. So they'l l get
the H R depa rtment to run hundreds of
managers a nd their su bord i nates th rough
i ntensive two- or three-day tra i n i ng pro
g ra ms. Workshops w i l l offer techniques for
getti ng g roups aligned arou nd com mon
goals, for clarifyi ng roles and responsi bili
ties, for operati ng accord i ng to a shared set
of behaviora l norms, and so on.
U nfortu nately, such workshops a re usu
ally the right solution to the wrong prob
lems. Fi rst, the most critical breakdowns i n
collaboration typically occur not on actual
teams but in the rapid and unstructu red
i nteractions between different g rou ps
with i n the organization. For exa m ple,
someone from R&D will spend weeks un
successfu l ly tryi ng to get help from manu
factu ring to run a few tests on a new proto
type. Meanwhile, people in manufacturi ng
beg i n to com plain about arrogant engi
neers from R&D expecting them to drop
everything to hel p with another one of
R&D's pet projects. Clearly, the need for
collaboration extends to areas other than a
formal team.
The second problem is that breakdowns
in col l aboration al most always resu lt from
fu ndamental differences among busi ness
functions a nd d ivisions. Tea mwork tra i n
i ng offers l ittle guidance on how to work
together in the context ofcompeti ng objec
tives and l i m ited resources. I ndeed, the fre
q uent em phasis on common goals fu rther
stigmatizes the idea of conflict in organiza
tions where an emphasis on "pol ite" be
havior reg u l a rly prevents effective problem
solving. People who need to col laborate
more effectively usually don't need to align
around a nd work toward a common goal.
They need to qu ickly and creatively solve
problems by manag i ng the i nevita ble con
fl ict so that it works i n their favor.

It's a tanta l izing proposition: You can ha rd
wire col laboration i nto you r org a n ization
by rewarding collaborative behavior. Sales
people receive bonuses not only for hitti ng
targets for their own d ivision's products
but also for hitting cross-sel l i ng targets.
Staff in corporate support fu nctions l i ke IT
and procurement have pa rt of the i r bo
nuses determi ned by positive feedback
from their i nternal clients.
U nfortu nately, the results of such pro
g rams are usually d isappointing. Despite
g reater financial i ncentives, for exa mple,
salespeople conti nue to focus on the sales
of their own prod ucts to the detriment of
sel l i ng i ntegrated sol utions. E m ployees
conti nue to perceive the IT and procu re
ment departments as d ifficult to work
with, too focused on the i r own priorities.
Why such poor resu lts? To some extent, it's
because i ndivid uals thi n k-for the most
part correctly-that if they perform wel l i n
their own operation they w i l l b e "taken
care of" by their bosses. I n addition, many
people fi nd that the costs of worki ng with
i nd ividuals in other parts of the organiza
tion-the extra ti me req u i red, the agg rava
tion-g reatly outwei g h the rewards for
doing so.
Certai nly, misa l i g ned i ncentives can be
a tremendous obstacle to cross-bou ndary
col laboration. But even the most carefu l ly
constructed i ncentives won't e l i m i nate ten
sions between people with com peti ng
busi ness objectives. An i ncentive is too
blunt an i nstru ment to enable opti mal res
ol ution of the hundreds of d ifferent trade
offs that need to be made i n a com plex or
gan ization. What's more, overem phasis on
i ncentives can create a culture i n which
people say, "If the com pany wa nted me to
do that, they wou ld bu ild it i nto my com p
plan:· I ronical ly, focusi ng on i ncentives as
a means to encou rage col laboration can
end up underm i n i ng it.

M a ny managers look for structu ral and
procedu ral solutions-cross-fu nctional
task forces, coll aborative "g rou pware;•
com plex webs of dotted reporti ng Ii nes on
the organization chart-to create g reater
i nternal col laboration. But bring i ng people
together is very different from getti ng
them to col laborate.
Consider the fol low i ng scena rio. I ndi
vid u a l i nformation tech nology depa rt
ments have been stripped out of a com
pany's busi ness un its and moved to a
corporatewide, sha red-services IT org a n i
zation. Senior ma nagers rig htly recog nize
that th is ki nd of change is a reci pe for con
fl ict because va rious g rou ps w i l l now es
senti a l ly com pete with one another for
sca rce IT resou rces. So managers try
m i g hti ly to desig n confl ict out of, a nd col
laboration i nto, the new organ ization. For
exa m ple, to ena ble col l a borative decision
maki ng with i n IT a nd between IT and the
busi ness u nits, busi ness u n its a re re
q u i red to enter req uests for IT support
i nto a com puterized tracki ng system. The
system is desig ned to enable ma nagers
with i n the IT organization to prioritize
projects a nd opti ma l ly deploy resou rces
to meet the various requests.
Despite pa i nstaking process design, re
su lts a re d i sa ppoi nti ng. To avoid the i nevi
table confl icts between busi ness u n its a nd
IT over project prioritization, managers
i n the busi ness u n its qu ickly learn to
bring the i r req uests to those they know i n
the IT org a n i zation rather tha n enteri ng
the req uests i nto the new system. Conse
quently, IT professionals assume that a ny
project i n the system is a lower priority
fu rther d i scou rag i ng use of the system.
People's i nabil ity to dea l effectively with
confl ict has u ndermi ned a new process
specifica l ly desig ned to foster organiza
tional col l a boration.
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that are likely to emerge from discussions that
draw on a multitude of objectives and perspec
tives. There is an array of conflict resolution
methods a company can use. But to be effec
tive, they should offer a clear, step-by-step pro
cess for parties to follow. They should also be
made an integral part of existing business ac
tivities-account planning, sourcing, R&D
budgeting, and the like. If conflict resolution is
set up as a separate, exception-based process
a kind of organizational appeals court-it will
likely wither away once initial managerial en
thusiasm wanes.
At Intel, new employees learn a common
method and language for decision making and
conflict resolution. The company puts them
through training in which they learn to use a
variety of tools for handling discord. Not only
does the training show that top management
sees disagreements as an inevitable aspect of
doing business, it also provides a common
framework that expedites conflict resolution.
Little time is wasted in figuring out the best
way to handle a disagreement or trading accu
sations about "not being a team player";
guided by this clearly defined process, people
can devote their time and energy to exploring
and constructively evaluating a variety of op
tions for how to move forward. Intel's system
atic method for working through differences
has helped sustain some of the company's hall
mark qualities: innovation, operational effi
ciency, and the ability to make and implement
hard decisions in the face of complex strategic
choices.

Provide people with criteria for making
trad�ffs. At our hypothetical Matrix Corpo

ration, senior managers overseeing cross-unit
sales teams often admonish those teams to "do
what's right for the customer:' Unfortunately,
this exhortation isn't much help when conflict
arises. Given Matrix's ability to offer numer
ous combinations of products and services,
company managers-each with different
training and experience and access to different
information, not to mention different unit pri
orities-have, not surprisingly, different opin
ions about how best to meet customers' needs.
Similar clashes in perspective result when ex
asperated senior managers tell squabbling
team members to set aside their differences
and "put Matrix's interests first'' That's be
cause it isn't always clear what's best for the
company given the complex interplay among
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Matrix's objectives for revenue, profitability,
market share, and long-term growth.
Even when companies equip people with a
common method for resolving conflict, em
ployees often will still need to make zero-sum
trade-offs between competing priorities. That
task is made much easier and less contentious
when top management can clearly articulate
the criteria for making such choices. Obvi
ously, it's not easy to reduce a company's strat
egy to clearly defined trade-offs, but it's worth
trying. For example, salespeople who know
that five points of market share are more im
portant than a ten point increase on a cus
tomer satisfaction scale are much better
equipped to make strategic concessions when
the needs and priorities of different parts of
the business conflict. And even when the cri
teria do not lead to a straightforward answer,
the guidelines can at least foster productive
conversations by providing an objective focus.
Establishing such criteria also sends a clear
signal from management that it views conflict
as an inevitable result of managing a complex
business.
At Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida,
the strategic decision to rely more and more on
alliances with other organizations has signifi
cantly increased the potential for disagree
ment in an organization long accustomed to
developing capabilities in-house. Decisions
about whether to build new capabilities, buy
them outright, or gain access to them through
alliances are natural flashpoints for conflict
among internal groups. The health insurer
might have tried to minimize such conflict
through a structural solution, giving a particu
lar group the authority to make decisions con
cerning whether, for instance, to develop a new
claims-processing system in-house, to do so
jointly with an alliance partner, or to license or
acquire an existing system from a third party.
Instead, the company established a set of crite
ria designed to help various groups within the
organization-for example, the enterprise alli
ance group, IT, and marketing-to collectively
make such decisions.
The criteria are embodied in a spreadsheet
type tool that guides people in assessing the
trade-offs involved-say, between speed in get
ting a new process up and running versus en
suring its seamless integration with existing
ones-when deciding whether to build, buy, or
ally. People no longer debate back and forth
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across a table, advocating their preferred out
comes. Instead, they sit around the table and
together apply a common set of trade-off crite
ria to the decision at hand. Toe resulting in
sights into the pros and cons of each approach
enable more effective execution, no matter
which path is chosen. (For a simplified version
of the trade-off tool, see the exhibit "Blue Cross
and Blue Shield: Build, Buy, or Ally?")
Use the escalation of confl ict as an op
portu n ity for coaching. Managers at Matrix
spend much of their time playing the organi
zational equivalent of hot potato. Even people
who are new to the company learn within
weeks that the best thing to do with cross-unit
conflict is to toss it up the management chain.

Immediate supervisors take a quick pass at re
solving the dispute but, being busy them
selves, usually pass it up to their supervisors.
Those supervisors do the same, and before
long the problem lands in the lap of a senior
level manager, who then spends much of his
time resolving disagreements. Clearly, this
isn't ideal. Because the senior managers are a
number of steps removed from the source of
the controversy, they rarely have a good un
derstanding of the situation. Furthermore, the
more time they spend resolving internal
clashes, the less time they spend engaged in
the business, and the more isolated they are
from the very information they need to re
solve the disputes dumped in their laps. Mean-

Blue Cross and Blue Shield: Build, Buy, or Ally?
One of the most effective ways seni o r m a n ag
e rs ca n hel p resolve cross-u nit confl ict is by
g iv i n g people the criteria for maki ng trade
offs w h e n the needs of differe nt pa rts of the
busi ness a re at odds with one a n other. At

h e l ps m u ltiple parties a n a lyze the trade-offs
associ ated with these th ree options. By
c hecki ng various boxes i n the g rid using per
son a l ized ma rkers, pa rtic i pa nts i nd i cate how
they assess a particu l a r o ption agai nst a vari

B l u e Cross a n d B l ue S h ield of F lorida, there

ety of criteria: for exa m ple, the date by which

a re ofte n conflicti ng perspectives ove r

the new ca pa b i l ity needs to be i m plemented;

w hether to bu i ld new ca pa b i l ities (for exa m

the ava i la b i l ity of i nte r n a l resou rces such as
ca pita l and staff needed to develop the ca pa
b i l ity; a nd the deg ree of i nteg ration req u i red

ple, a new c l a i m s-processi ng system, as i n the
hypothetical exa m ple below), acq u i re them,
o r g a i n access to them th roug h an a l l i a nce.
The co m pa ny u ses a g rid-l i ke poster (a s i m
pl ified version of which is shown here) that

pie's "votes" a n d the e n s u i n g d i scussion hel p
i nd ivid u a l s see how the i r differences often
a rise from such factors as access to d iffe rent
data or d iffe re nt prioritizi ng of objectives. As
debate u nfo l d s-a nd as people move thei r
marke rs i n res ponse to new i nformation
they ca n see where they a re a l i g ned a n d
where a nd why they sepa rate i nto sig n ifica nt
factions of d i sag reement. Eve ntu a l ly, the c ri
te ri a-based d i a logue te nds to prod uce a pre

w ith existi ng prod ucts a nd processes. The

ponde ra nce of m a rkers i n one of the th ree

ta ble format m a kes criteria a nd trade-offs
easy to com pa re. The v i s u a l depiction of peo-

rows, th us yield i ng operatio n a l consensus
a round a decision.

New Claims-Processing System
Required
Implementation
Time frame
>12 months

✓

<6 months

*x
6-1 2 months

Participant 1 = /

Organizational
Experience
level
High

low *

Xx

V;

Medium

Participant 2 = "

Availability
oflnternal
Resources
High

X

High to
m

Volatility of
Environment

low

low

✓

Xx

*

High

x
Moderate to low

Participant 3 =
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*✓

Moderate

·;(;r

Availability
of External
Resources

Complexity
of Solution

Participant 4 =

X

Required
Degree of
Integration
High

low

High

*
Hi

vX

X *

Moderate

Participant 5 = )(

Required
Control

X

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

BUILD

xX; *I
X

ALLY

Sou rce: Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida
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while, Matrix employees get so little opportu
nity to learn about how to deal with conflict
that it becomes not only expedient but almost
necessary for them to quickly bump conflict
up the management chain.
While Matrix's story may sound extreme,
we can hardly count the number of companies
we've seen that operate this way. And even in
the best of situations-for example, where a
companywide conflict-management process is
in place and where trade-off criteria are well
understood-there is still a natural tendency
for people to let their bosses sort out disputes.
Senior managers contribute to this tendency
by quickly resolving the problems presented to
them. While this may be the fastest and easiest
way to fix the problems, it encourages people
to punt issues upstairs at the first sign of diffi-

culty. Instead, managers should treat escala
tions as opportunities to help employees be
come better at resolving conflict. (For an
example of how managers can help their em
ployees improve their conflict resolution skills,
see the exhibit "IBM: Coaching for Conflict.")
At KIA-Tencor, a major manufacturer of
semiconductor production equipment, a mate
rials executive in each division oversees a num
ber of buyers who procure the materials and
component parts for machines that the divi
sion makes. When negotiating a companywide
contract with a supplier, a buyer often must
work with the company commodity manager,
as well as with buyers from other divisions
who deal with the same supplier. There is
often conflict, for example, over the delivery
terms for components supplied to two or more

IBM: Coaching for Conflict
Managers ca n reduce the repeated esca lation
of confl ict up the management chai n by hel ping em ployees learn how to resolve disputes
themselves. At I BM , executives get tra ining
in conflict management a nd are offered on-

l i ne resou rces to hel p them coach others. One
tool on the corporate intranet (an edited excerpt of which is shown here) wal ks managers through a variety of conversations they
might have with a d i rect report who is strug-

g l i ng to resolve a d ispute with people from
one or more g rou ps i n the company-some
of whom, by design, will be consu lted to get
thei r views but won't be involved i n negotiat
i ng the final decision.

If you hear from someone
reporting to you that . . .

The problem
could be that . . .

And you could help your report
by saying something like . . .

"Everyone still insists on being
a decision maker:'

The people your report is dealing with remain concerned
that unless they have a formal
voice in making the decisionor a key piece of the decisiontheir needs and interests won't
be taken into account.

"You might want to explain why people are being consulted and how
this information will be used:'

>

"Are there ways to break this decision apart into a series of subissues
and assign decision-making roles around those subissues?"

E

"Consider talking to the group about the costs of having everyone
involved in the final decision:'
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"If I consult with this person
up front, he might try
to force an answer on me
or create roadblocks to my
efforts to move forward:'

"I have consulted with all
the right parties and have
crafted, by all accounts,
a good plan. But the decision
makers cannot settle on
a final decision:'
PAGE 6

The person you are coaching
may be overlooking the risks of
not asking for input-mainly,
that any decision arrived at
without input could be sabotaged later on.

The right people were included
in the negotiating group, but the
process for negotiating a final
decision was not determined.

"How would you ask someone for input? What would you tell her about
your purpose in seeking it? What questions would you ask? What would
you say if she put forth a solution and resisted discussing other options?"
"Is there a way to manage the risk that she will try to block your efforts
other than by not consulting her at all? If you consult with her now, might
that in fact lower the risk that she will try to derail your efforts later?''

"What are the ground rules for how decisions will be made? Do all those
in the group need to agree? Must the majority agree? Or just those with
the greatest competence?''
"What interests underlie the objective of having everyone agree? Is there
another decision-making process that would meet those interests?''
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divisions under the contract. In such cases, the
commodity manager and the division materi
als executive will push the division buyer to
consider the needs of the other divisions, alter
natives that might best address the collective
needs of the different divisions, and the stan
dards to be applied in assessing the trade-offs
between alternatives. The aim is to help the
buyer see solutions that haven't yet been con
sidered and to resolve the conflict with the
buyer in the other division.
Initially, this approach required more time
from managers than if they had simply made
the decisions themselves. But it has paid off in
fewer disputes that senior managers need to
resolve, speedier contract negotiation, and
improved contract terms both for the com
pany as a whole and for multiple divisions.
For example, the buyers from three KLA-Ten
cor product divisions recently locked horns
over a global contract with a key supplier. At
issue was the trade-off between two variables:
one, the supplier's level of liability for materi
als it needs to purchase in order to fulfill or
ders and, two, the flexibility granted the KLA
Tencor divisions in modifying the size of the
orders and their required lead times. Each di
vision demanded a different balance between
these two factors, and the buyers took the
conflict to their managers, wondering if they
should try to negotiate each of the different
trade-offs into the contract or pick among
them. After being coached to consider how
each division's business model shaped its pref
erence-and using this understanding to
jointly brainstorm alternatives-the buyers
and commodity manager arrived at a creative
solution that worked for everyone: They
would request a clause in the contract that al
lowed them to increase and decrease flexibil
ity in order volume and lead time, with corre
sponding changes in supplier liability, as
required by changing market conditions.

::,

Strateg ies for Manag i ng Confl ict
upon Escalation
Equipped with common conflict resolution
methods and trade-off criteria, and supported
by systematic coaching, people are better able
to resolve conflict on their own. But certain
complex disputes will inevitably need to be de
cided by superiors. Consequently, managers
must ensure that, upon escalation, conflict is
resolved constructively and efficiently-and
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in ways that model desired behaviors.
Establish and enforce a requirement of
joint escalation. Let's again consider the situa
tion at Matrix. In a typical conflict, three sales
people from different divisions become in
volved in a dispute over pricing. Frustrated,
one of them decides to hand the problem up
to his boss, explaining the situation in a short
voice-mail message. The message offers little
more than bare acknowledgment of the other
salespeoples' viewpoints. The manager then
determines, on the basis of what he knows
about the situation, the solution to the prob
lem. The salesperson, armed with his boss's
decision, returns to his counterparts and
shares with them the verdict-which, given
the process, is simply a stronger version of the
solution the salesperson had put forward in
the first place. But wait! The other two sales
people have also gone to their managers and
carried back stronger versions of their solu
tions. At this point, each salesperson is locked
into what is now "my manager's view" of the
right pricing scheme. The problem, already
thorny, has become even more intractable.
The best way to avoid this kind of debilitat
ing deadlock is for people to present a dis
agreement jointly to their boss or bosses. This
will reduce or even eliminate the suspicion,
surprises, and damaged personal relationships
ordinarily associated with unilateral escala
tion. It will also guarantee that the ultimate
decision maker has access to a wide array of
perspectives on the conflict, its causes, and the
various ways it might be resolved Further
more, companies that require people to share
responsibility for the escalation of a conflict
often see a decrease in the number of prob
lems that are pushed up the management
chain. Joint escalation helps create the kind of
accountability that is lacking when people
know they can provide their side of an issue to
their own manager and blame others when
things don't work out.
A few years ago, after a merger that re
sulted in a much larger and more complex or
ganization, senior managers at the Canadian
telecommunications company Telus found
themselves virtually paralyzed by a daily bar
rage of unilateral escalations. Just determin
ing who was dealing with what and who
should be talking to whom took up huge
amounts of senior management's time. So the
company made joint escalation a central

PA G E 7

Wa nt Colla boration?

tenet of its new organizationwide protocols
for conflict resolution-a requirement given
teeth by managers' refusal to respond to uni
lateral escalation. When a conflict occurred
among managers in different departments
concerning, say, the allocation of resources
among the departments, the managers were
required to jointly describe the problem,
what had been done so far to resolve it, and
its possible solutions. Then they had to send a
joint write-up of the situation to each of their
bosses and stand ready to appear together
and answer questions when those bosses met
to work through a solution. In many cases,
the requirement of systematically document
ing the conflict and efforts to resolve it-be
cause it forced people to make such efforts
led to a problem being resolved on the spot,
without having to be kicked upstairs. Within
weeks, this process resulted in the resolution
of hundreds of issues that had been stalled for
months in the newly merged organization.
Ensure that managers resolve escalated
conflicts directly with their counterparts.

Let's return to the three salespeople at Matrix
who took their dispute over pricing to their re
spective bosses and then met again, only to
find themselves further from agreement than
before. So what did they do at that point? They
sent the problem back to their bosses. These
three bosses, each of whom thought he'd al
ready resolved the issue, decided the easiest
thing to do would be to escalate it themselves.
This would save them time and put the con
flict before senior managers with the broad
view seemingly needed to make a decision.
Unfortunately, by doing this, the three bosses
simply perpetuated the situation their sales
people had created, putting forward a biased
viewpoint and leaving it to their own manag
ers to come up with an answer. In the end, the
decision was made unilaterally by the senior
manager with the most organizational clout.
This result bred resentment back down the
management chain. A sense of"we'll win next
time" took hold, ensuring that future conflict
would be even more difficult to resolve.
It's not unusual to see managers react to es
calations from their employees by simply pass
ing conflicts up their own functional or divi
sional chains until they reach a senior
executive involved with all the affected func
tions or divisions. Besides providing a poor ex
ample for others in the organization, this can
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be disastrous for a company that needs to
move quickly. To avoid wasting time, a man
ager somewhere along the chain might try to
resolve the problem swiftly and decisively by
herself But this, too, has its costs. In a complex
organization, where many issues have signifi
cant implications for numerous parts of the
business, unilateral responses to unilateral es
calations are a recipe for inefficiency, bad deci
sions, and ill feelings.
The solution to these problems is a commit
ment by managers-a commitment codified in
a formal policy-to deal with escalated conflict
directly with their counterparts. Of course,
doing this can feel cumbersome, especially
when an issue is time-sensitive. But resolving
the problem early on is ultimately more effi
cient than trying to sort it out later, after a de
cision becomes known because it has nega
tively affected some part of the business.
In the 199os, IBM's sales and delivery orga
nization became increasingly complex as the
company reintegrated previously independent
divisions and reorganized itself to provide cus
tomers with full solutions of bundled products
and services. Senior executives soon recog
nized that managers were not dealing with es
calated conflicts and that relationships among
them were strained because they failed to con
sult and coordinate around cross-unit issues.
This led to the creation of a forum called the
Market Growth Workshop (a name carefully
chosen to send a message throughout the com
pany that getting cross-unit conflict resolved
was critical to meeting customer needs and, in
tum, growing market share). These monthly
conference calls brought together managers,
salespeople, and frontline product specialists
from across the company to discuss and resolve
cross-unit conflicts that were hindering impor
tant sales-for example, the difficulty salespeo
ple faced in getting needed technical resources
from overstretched product groups.
The Market Growth Workshops weren't suc
cessful right away. In the beginning, busy se
nior managers, reluctant to spend time on is
sues that often hadn't been carefully thought
through, began sending their subordinates to
the meetings-which made it even more diffi
cult to resolve the problems discussed So the
company developed a simple preparation tem
plate that forced people to document and ana
lyze disputes before the conference calls. Se
nior managers, realizing the problems created
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by their absence, recommitted themselves to
attending the meetings. Over time, as complex
conflicts were resolved during these sessions
and significant sales were closed, attendees
began to see these meetings as an opportunity
to be involved in the resolution of high-stakes,
high-visibility issues.
Make the process for escalated conflict res
olution transparent. When a sales conflict is
resolved by a Matrix senior manager, the word
comes down the management chain in the
form of an action item: Put together an offer
ing with this particular mix of products and
services at these prices. The only elaboration
may be an admonishment to "get the sales
team together, work up a proposal, and get
back to the customer as quickly as possible:'
The problem is solved, at least for the time be
ing. But the salespeople-unless they have
been able to divine themes from the patterns
of decisions made over time-are left with lit
tle guidance on how to resolve similar issues in
the future. They may justifiably wonder: How
was the decision made? Based on what kinds
of assumptions? With what kinds of trade
offs? How might the reasoning change if the
situation were different?
In most companies, once managers have re
solved a conflict, they announce the decision
and move on. The resolution process and ra
tionale behind the decision are left inside a
managerial black box. While it's rarely helpful
for managers to share all the gory details of
their deliberations around contentious issues,
failing to take the time to explain how a deci
sion was reached and the factors that went
into it squanders a major opportunity. A frank
discussion of the trade-offs involved in deci
sions would provide guidance to people trying
to resolve conflicts in the future and would
help nip in the bud the kind of speculation
who won and who lost, which managers or
units have the most power-that breeds mis
trust, sparks turf battles, and otherwise im
pedes cross-organizational collaboration. In
general, clear communication about the reso
lution of the conflict can increase people's will
ingness and ability to implement decisions.
During the past two years, IBM's Market
Growth Workshops have evolved into a more
structured approach to managing escalated
conflict, known as Cross-Team Workouts. De
signed to make conflict resolution more trans
parent, the workouts are weekly meetings of

wos
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people across the organization who work to
gether on sales and delivery issues for specific
accounts. The meetings provide a public
forum for resolving conflicts over account
strategy, solution configuration, pricing, and
delivery. Those issues that cannot be resolved
at the local level are escalated to regional
workout sessions attended by managers from
product groups, services, sales, and finance.
Attendees then communicate and explain
meeting resolutions to their reports. Issues
that cannot be resolved at the regional level
are escalated to an even higher-level workout
meeting attended by cross-unit executives
from a larger geographic region-like the
Americas or Asia Pacific-and chaired by the
general manager of the region presenting the
issue. The most complex and strategic issues
reach this global forum. The overlapping at
tendance at these sessions-in which the
managers who chair one level of meeting at
tend sessions at the next level up, thereby ob
serving the decision-making process at that
stage-further enhances the transparency of
the system among different levels of the com
pany. IBM has further formalized the process
for the direct resolution of conflicts between
services and product sales on large accounts
by designating a managing director in sales
and a global relationship partner in IBM glo
bal services as the ultimate point of resolu
tion for escalated conflicts. By explicitly mak
ing the resolution of complex conflicts part of
the job descriptions for both managing direc
tor and global relationship partner-and by
making that clear to others in the organiza
tion-IBM has reduced ambiguity, increased
transparency, and increased the efficiency
with which conflicts are resolved.
Tapping the Learn ing Latent i n
Conflict
The six strategies we have discussed constitute
a framework for effectively managing organi
zational discord, one that integrates conflict
resolution into day-to-day decision-making
processes, thereby removing a critical barrier
to cross-organizational collaboration. But the
strategies also hint at something else: that con
flict can be more than a necessary antecedent
to collaboration.
Let's return briefly to Matrix. More than
three-quarters of all cross-unit sales at the com
pany trigger disputes about pricing. Roughly
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half of the sales lead to clashes over account
control. A substantial number of sales also pro
duce disagreements over the design of cus
tomer solutions, with the conflict often rooted
in divisions' incompatible measurement sys
tems and the concerns of some people about
the quality of the solutions being assembled.
But managers are so busy trying to resolve
these almost daily disputes that they don't see
the patterns or sources of conflict. Interest
ingly, if they ever wanted to identify patterns
like these, Matrix managers might find few
signs of them. That's because salespeople, who
regularly hear their bosses complain about all
the disagreements in the organization, have
concluded that they'd better start shielding
their superiors from discord.
The situation at Matrix is not unusual
most companies view conflict as an unneces
sary nuisance-but that view is unfortunate.
When a company begins to see conflict as a
valuable resource that should be managed and
exploited, it is likely to gain insight into prob
lems that senior managers may not have
!mown existed Because internal friction is
often caused by unaddressed strains within an
organization or between an organization and
its environment, setting up methods to track
conflict and examine its causes can provide an
interesting new perspective on a variety of is
sues. In the case of Matrix, taking the time to
aggregate the experiences of individual sales
people involved in recurring disputes would
likely lead to better approaches to setting
prices, establishing incentives for salespeople,
and monitoring the company's quality control
process.
At Johnson & Johnson, an organization that
has a highly decentralized structure, conflict is
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recognized as a positive aspect of cross-com
pany collaboration. For example, a small inter
nal group charged with facilitating sourcing col
laboration among J&J's independent operating
companies-particularly their outsourcing of
clinical research services-actively works to ex
tract lessons from conflicts. The group tracks
and analyzes disagreements about issues such
as what to outsource, whether and how to shift
spending among suppliers, and what supplier
capabilities to invest in. It hosts a council, com
prising representatives from the various operat
ing companies, that meets regularly to discuss
these differences and explore their strategic im
plications. As a result, trends in clinical research
outsourcing are spotted and information about
them is disseminated throughout J&J more
quickly. The operating companies benefit from
insights about new offshoring opportunities,
technologies, and ways of structuring collabora
tion with suppliers. And J&J, which can now
piece together an accurate and global view of
its suppliers, is better able to partner with
them. Furthermore, the company realizes more
value from its relationship with suppliers-yet
another example of how the effective manage
ment of conflict can ultimately lead to fruitful
collaboration.
J&J's approach is unusual but not unique.
The benefits it offers provide further evidence
that conflict-so often viewed as a liability to be
avoided whenever possible-can be valuable to
a company that !mows how to manage it.
Reprint R05 0 3 F
To order, see the next page
or call 800-988-0886 or 617-78 3-7500
or go to www.hbr.org

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW • MARCH 2005

L
hod
1ent
:om
:ked
iliar
tles
rod
n to
heir
1ore
gree
de
pris
¥ho
par
l re
d.is1er's

Harvard Busines.5 Review

OnPoint�
Harvard Business Review On Point
articles enhance the full-text article
with a summary of its key points and
a selection of its company examples
to help you quickly absorb and apply
the concepts. Harvard Business
Review On Point collections include
three OnPoint articles and an
overview comparing the various
perspectives on a specific topic.

: re
iliar
vellre
and
,me
ices.
nes
1005

The Harvard Business Review
Paperback Series
Here are the landmark ideas-both
contem porary and classic-that have
established Harvard Business Review as req u i red
read ing for businesspeople arou nd the g lobe.
Each paperback incl udes eight of the lead ing
articles on a particular busi ness topic. The
series includes over th irty titles, includ i ng the
fol low i ng best-sel lers:
Harvard Business Review on Brand
Management
Product no. 1445
Harvard Business Review on Change
Product no. 8842

:ree
¥110
the
, my
uge
side
ner.
:ela
t in-

rob
fees
But
\Tith
not
but
will
rgo
·ate.
heir
apho's
nall
nse
nal,
out-

Further Reading

Harvard Business Review on Leadership
Product no. 8834
Harvard Business Review on Managing
People
Product no. 9075
Harvard Business Review on Measuring
Corporate Performance
Product no. 8826
For a com plete l ist of the Harvard Business
Review paperback series, go to www.h br.org.

Harvard Business Review �
To Order
For reprints, Harvard Business Review
OnPoint orders, and subscriptions
to Harvard Business Review:
Call 800-988-0886 or 61 7-783-7500.
Go to www.hbr.org
For customized and quantity orders
of reprints and Harvard Business
Review On Point products:
Call Frank Tamoshunas at
61 7-783-7626,
or e-mail him at
ftamosh unas@h bsp.ha rvard .ed u
PAGE 1 1

Harvard Business Review �
www. h br.org

U.S. a n d Canada
800-98 8-088 6
617-7 8 3-75 00
617-7 8 3-7555 fax

Harvard Business Review�
www. h b r. o rg

Techniques that can help you
seal a deal may end up
torpedoing the relationship
when it's time to put the deal
into operation.

Getting Past Yes

Negotiating as if Imp lementation Mattered
by Da n ny E rte l

For more information please contact:

vantagepartners
Vantage Partners
Brighton Landing West
1 0 Guest Street
Boston, MA 02 1 35
Tel : 6 1 7 354 6090
Fax: 6 1 7 354 4685
Email : info@vantagepartners.com
Visit us online at www.vantagepartners.com

Repri nt R041 1 C

port
sagE
tion
part
deal
lool<
amc
that
h
is rn
ing
muc
buil,
with
heal
tent
and
tryir
deve
Cros
pie,
appr
strer
supp
orati
been
to th
sis tc
man;
resp<
men1
In ot
the c
ing tl
tion

HARVA

Techniques that can help you seal a deal may end up torpedoing the
relationship when it's time to put the deal into operation.

Getting Past Yes

Negotiating as if Implementation Mattered
by Da n ny Erte l

In July 1998, AT&T and BT announced a new
50/50 joint venture that promised to bring glo
bal interconnectivity to multinational custom
ers. Concert, as the venture was called, was
launched with great fanfare and even greater
expectations: The $10 billion start-up would
pool assets, talent, and relationships and was
expected to log $1 billion in profits from day
one. Just three years later, Concert was out of
business. It had laid off 2,300 employees, an
nounced $7 billion in charges, and returned its
infrastructure assets to the parent companies.
To be sure, the weak market played a role in
Concert's demise, but the way the deal was put
together certainly hammered a few nails into
the coffin.
For example, AT&T's deal makers scored
what they probably considered a valuable win
when they negotiated a way for AT&T Solu
tions to retain key multinational customers for
itself. As a result, AT&T and BT ended up in di
rect competition for business-exactly what
the Concert venture was supposed to help pre
vent. For its part, BT seemingly outnegotiated
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AT&T by refusing to contribute to AT& T's pur
chase of the IBM Global Network. That move
saved BT money, but it muddied Concert's
strategy, leaving the start-up to contend with
overlapping products. In 2000, Concert an
nounced a complex new arrangement that was
supposed to clarify its strategy, but many ques
tions about account ownership, revenue recog
nition, and competing offerings went unan
swered. Ultimately, the two parent companies
pulled the plug on the venture.1
Concert is hardly the only alliance that
began with a signed contract and a champagne
toast but ended in bitter disappointment. Ex
amples abound of deals that look terrific on
paper but never materialize into effective,
value-creating endeavors. And it's not just alli
ances that can go bad during implementation.
Misfortune can befall a whole range of agree
ments that involve two or more parties-merg
ers, acquisitions, outsourcing contracts, even
internal projects that require the cooperation
of more than one department. Although the
problem often masquerades as one of execu-
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tion, its roots are anchored in the deal's incep
tion, when negotiators act as if their main ob
jective were to sign the deal. To be successful,
negotiators must recognize that signing a con
tract is just the beginning of the process of cre
ating value.
During the past 20 years, I've analyzed or
assisted in hundreds of complex negotiations,
both through my research at the Harvard Ne
gotiation Project and through my consulting
practice. And I've seen countless deals that
were signed with optimism fall apart during
implementation, despite the care and creativ
ity with which their terms were crafted. The
crux of the problem is that the very person ev
eryone thinks is central to the deal-the nego
tiator-is often the one who undermines the
partnership's ability to succeed. The real chal
lenge lies not in hammering out little victories
on the way to signing on the dotted line but in
designing a deal that works in practice.

The Danger of Deal M a kers

Danny Ertel (dertel@vantagepartners.

com) is a founder and director of
Vantage Partners, a consulting firm in
Boston, and CEO and chairman of
Vantage Technologies, which develops
software to enable negotiation and
relationship management processes.
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It's easy to see where the deal maker mind-set
comes from. The media glorifies big-name
deal makers like Donald Trump, Michael
Ovitz, and Bruce Wasserstein. Books like You
Can Negotiate Anything, Trump: The Art of the
Deal, and even my own partners' Getting to Yes
all position the end of the negotiation as the
destination. And most companies evaluate
and compensate negotiators based on the size
of the deals they're signing.
But what kind of behavior does this ap
proach create? People who view the contract
as the conclusion and see themselves as solely
responsible for getting there behave very dif
ferently from those who see the agreement as
just the beginning and believe their role is to
ensure that the parties involved actually real
ize the value they are trying to create. These
two camps have conflicting opinions about the
use of surprise and the sharing of information.
They also differ in how much attention they
pay to whether the parties' commitments are
realistic, whether their stakeholders are suffi
ciently aligned, and whether those who must
implement the deal can establish a suitable
working relationship with one another. (For a
comparison of how different mind-sets affect
negotiation behaviors, see the exhibit "Deal
Minded Negotiators Versus Implementation
Minded Negotiators?')
This isn't to say deal makers are sleazy, dis-

honest, or unethical. Being a deal maker
means being a good closer. The deal maker
mind-set is the ideal approach in certain cir
cumstances. For example, when negotiating
the sale of an asset in which title will simply be
transferred and the parties will have little or no
need to work together, getting the signatures
on the page really does define success.
But frequently a signed contract represents
a commitment to work together to create
value. When that's the case, the manner in
which the parties "get to yes" matters a great
deal. Unfortunately, many organizations struc
ture their negotiation teams and manage the
flow of information in ways that actually hurt
a deal's chances of being implemented well.
An organization that embraces the deal
maker approach, for instance, tends to struc
ture its business development teams in a way
that drives an ever growing stream of new
deals. These dedicated teams, responsible for
keeping negotiations on track and getting
deals done, build tactical expertise, acquire
knowledge of useful contract terms, and go on
to sign more deals. But they also become de
tached from implementation and are likely to
focus more on the agreement than on its busi
ness impact. Just think about the language
deal-making teams use ("closing'' a deal, put
ting a deal "to bed") and how their perfor
mance is measured and rewarded (in terms of
the number and size of deals closed and the
time required to close them). These teams
want to sign a piece of paper and book the ex
pected value; they couldn't care less about
launching a relationship.
The much talked about Business Affairs en
gine at AOL under David Colburn is one ex
treme example. The group became so focused
on doing deals-the larger and more lopsided
the better-that it lost sight of the need to
have its business partners actually remain in
business or to have its deals produce more
than paper value. In 2002, following internal
investigations and probes by the SEC and the
Department of Justice, AOL Time Warner con
cluded it needed to restate financial results to
account for the real value ( or lack thereof) cre
ated by some of those deals.2
The deal maker mentality also fosters the
take-no-prisoners attitude common in procure
ment organizations. The aim: Squeeze your
counterpart for the best possible deal you can
get. Instead of focusing on deal volume, as
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Deal-Minded
Negotiators
Assu m ption
"S u rprising them h e l ps
me. They may commit
to somet h i n g they m i g h t
n o t have otherwise, a n d
we'll get a better dea l."

Behaviors
I ntrod uce new actors or
information at strategic
points in negotiation.
Raise new issues at
the end.

Implementation-Minded
Negotiators

Versus
Negotiation Tactics
}
{
surpris e
_ _
__ -.... _

Assumption
"Su rprising them puts u s
a t risk. They may com m it
to someth i n g they ca n n ot
del iver or w i ll reg ret:'

Behaviors
Propose agendas in adva nce
so both pa rties can prepa re.
Suggest questions to
be discussed, and provide
relevant data.
Raise issues early.

Assu m ption
"It's not my role to eq u i p
them with releva nt i nfor
mation or to correct their
m isperceptions:'

Assu m ption
"My job is to get the d e a l
closed. It's worth putt i n g
a l ittl e pressu re on them
no w and coping with
their u n ha p p i ness later:'

Behaviors
With hold i nformation.

Information
sharing

Fa i l to correct m i staken
i m p ressions.

Behaviors
Create artificial dead l i nes.
Th reaten esca lation.
M a ke "this day on ly" offers.

=

Closing
techniques

=

Assumption
"I don't want them entering
this deal feeling d u ped. I
wa nt their goodwil l d u ring
implementation, not their
g rudging com pliance'.'

Behaviors
Create a joint fact
gathering grou p.

Assumption
"My job is to create val u e
b y crafting a workable
agreement. I nvesting a
little extra time in making
sure both sides are aligned
is worth the effort'.'

Behaviors
Defi ne interests that need
to be considered for the
deal to be successfu l.

Com mission third-party
research and analysis.
Question everyone's
ass u m ptions openly.

Defi ne joint communication strategy.
QJ

�

Assu m ptions
"As long as they com m it,
that's a l l that matters.
Afterwa rd, it's their problem if they don't del iver:'

Behaviors
Focu s on doc u menting
com m itments rather t h a n
on testing the practical ity
of those commitments.

=

Realistic
commitments

=

Assumption
"If t h ey fa i l to d e l iver, we
d o n't get the va l u e w e
expect. "

Rely on pena lty clauses
for p rotection.

Behaviors
Ask tough questions a bout
both parties' ability to del iver.
Make im plementability
a shared concern.
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0
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0
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Establish early wa rn ing systerns and contingency plans.

�
::0

0
0

�

QJ

Assu m ption
"The fewer people involved
in making this decision,
the better and faster this
will go'.'

Behaviors
Limit participation in
d i sc u s s ions to decision
m a ke rs.
Kee p o utsiders i n the
dark u ntil it is too late
for t h e m to dera i l things.
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=

Decision making
and stakeholders

=

Assumption
"If we both fa i l to involve
key sta kehold ers sufficiently and early e n o u g h ,
whatever time w e save
now will be lost d u ri n g
i m p l ementation:'

Behaviors
Repeated ly ask about
sta keholders:
Whose approval is needed?
Whose cooperation is
req ui red?
Who might interfere with
implementation?
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business development engines do, these
groups concentrate on how many concessions
they can get. The desire to win outweighs the
costs of signing a deal that cannot work in
practice because the supplier will never be
able to make enough money.
Think about how companies handle nego
tiations with outsourcing providers. Few orga
nizations contract out enough of their work
to have as much expertise as the providers
themselves in negotiating deal structures,
terms and conditions, metrics, pricing, and
the like, so they frequently engage a third
party adviser to help level the playing field as
they select an outsourcer and hammer out a
contract. Some advisers actually trumpet
their role in commoditizing the providers' so
lutions so they can create "apples to apples"
comparison charts, engender competitive bid
ding, and drive down prices. To maximize
competitive tension, they exert tight control,
blocking virtually all communications be
tween would-be customers and service pro
viders. That means the outsourcers have al
most no opportunity to design solutions
tailored to the customer's unique business
drivers.
The results are fairly predictable. The deal
structure that both customer and provider
teams are left to implement is the one that was
easiest to compare with other bids, not the one
that would have created the most value. Worse
yet, when the negotiators on each side exit the
process, the people responsible for making the
deal work are virtual strangers and lack a nu
anced understanding of why issues were han-

A New Mind-Set
Five approaches ca n help you r negotiati ng tea m transition from a deal m a ker men
ta l ity to an i m p l e mentation m i n d-set.
1 . Start w ith the end in mind. I m a g
i ne the d e a l 1 2 months out: What h a s
g o n e w ro n g ? H ow d o y o u know if it's a
success? Who s h o u l d h ave been i n
volved ea r l i e r?
2. Help the m prepare, too. S u rpris
i ng the other s i d e d o esn't m a ke sen se,
beca u se i f they p ro m i se th i ngs they
ca n't d e l i ver, you both lose.
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3. Treat alignment as a shared re
sponsibil ity. If your cou nterpa rt's i nter

ests a ren't a l i g ned, it's you r problem, too.
4. Send one message. Brief i m ple
mentation tea ms on both sides of the
deal together so everyone has the same
i nformation.

5. Manage negotiation l i ke a busi
ness process. Com bine a d isci p l i ned

preparation process with postnegotiation
reviews.

dled the way they were. Furthermore, neither
side has earned the trust of its partner during
negotiations. The hard feelings created by the
hired guns can linger for years.
The fact is, organizations that depend on ne
gotiations for growth can't afford to abdicate
management responsibility for the process. It
would be foolhardy to leave negotiations en
tirely up to the individual wits and skills of
those sitting at the table on any given day.
That's why some corporations have taken steps
to make negotiation an organizational compe
tence. They have made the process more struc
tured by, for instance, applying Six Sigma disci
pline or community of practice principles to
improve outcomes and learn from past experi
ences.
Sarbanes-Oxley and an emphasis on greater
management accountability will only rein
force this trend. As more companies (and their
auditors) recognize the need to move to a con
trols-based approach for their deal-making pro
cesses-be they in sales, sourcing, or business
development-they will need to implement
metrics, tools, and process disciplines that pre
serve creativity and let managers truly manage
negotiators. How they do so, and how they de
fine the role of the negotiator, will determine
whether deals end up creating or destroying
value.

N egoti ati ng for I mplementation

Making the leap to an implementation mind
set requires five shifts.
1 . Sta rt w ith the end i n m i nd . For the in
volved parties to reap the benefits outlined in
the agreement, goodwill and collaboration are
needed during implementation. That's why
negotiation teams should carry out a simple
"benefit of hindsight" exercise as part of their
preparation.
Imagine that it is 12 months into the deal,
and ask yourself:
Is the deal working? What metrics are we us
ing? If quantitative metrics are too hard to de
fine, what other indications of success can we
use?
What has gone wrong sofar? What have we
done to put things back on course? What were
some early warning signals that the deal may
not meet its objectives?
What capabilities are necessary to accomplish
our objectives? What processes and tools must
be in place? What skills must the irnplementa-
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tion teams have? What attitudes or assump
tions are required of those who must imple
ment the deal? Who has tried to block
implementation, and how have we responded?
If negotiators are required to answer those
kinds of questions before the deal is finalized,
they cannot help but behave differently. For
example, if the negotiators of the Concert joint
venture had followed that line of questioning
before closing the deal, they might have asked
themselves, "What good is winning the right to
keep customers out of the deal if doing so
leads to competition between the alliance's
parents? And if we have to take that risk, can
we put in mechanisms now to help mitigate
it?" Raising those tough questions probably
wouldn't have made a negotiator popular, but
it might have led to different terms in the deal
and certainly to different processes and met
rics in the implementation plan.
Most organizations with experience in nego
tiating complex deals know that some terms
have a tendency to come back and bite them
during implementation. For example, in 50/50
ventures, the partner with greater leverage
often secures the right to break ties if the new
venture's steering committee should ever come
to an impasse on an issue. In practice, though,
that means executives from the dominant
party who go into negotiations to resolve such
impasses don't really have to engage with the
other side. At the end of the day, they know
they can simply impose their decision. But
when that happens, the relationship is fre
quently broken beyond repair.
Tom Finn, vice president of strategic plan
ning and alliances at Procter & Gamble Phar
maceuticals, has made it his mission to incor
porate tough lessons like that into the
negotiation process itself. Although Finn's alli
ance management responsibilities technically
don't start until after a deal has been negoti
ated by the P&G Pharmaceuticals business de
velopment organization, Finn jumps into the
negotiation process to ensure negotiators do
not bargain for terms that will cause trouble
down the road. "It's not just a matter of a win
win philosophy;' he says. "It's about incorporat
ing our alliance managers' hard-won experi
ence with terms that cause implementation
problems and not letting those terms into our
deals?'
Finn and his team avoid things like step
down royalties and unequal profit splits with

2004
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50/50 expense sharing, to name just a few. "It's
important that the partners be provided [with]
incentives to do the right thing;' Finn says.
"When those incentives shift, you tend to end
up [with] difficulties?' Step-down royalties, for
instance, are a common structure in the indus
try. They're predicated on the assumption that
a brand is made or lost in the first three years,
so that thereafter, payments to the originator
should go down. But P&G Pharmaceuticals be
lieves it is important to provide incentives to
the partner to continue to work hard over
time. As for concerns about overpaying for the
licensed compound in the latter years of the
contract, Finn asserts that "leaving some
money on the table is OK if you realize that the
most expensive deal is one that fails?'
2. Help them prepa re, too. If implementa
tion is the name of the game, then coming to
the table well prepared is necessary-but not
sufficient. Your counterpart must also be pre
pared to negotiate a workable deal. Some nego
tiators believe they can gain advantage by sur
prising the other side. But surprise confers
advantage only because the counterpart has
failed to think through all the implications of a
proposal and might mistakenly commit to
something it wouldn't have if it had been better
prepared. While that kind of an advantage
might pay off in a simple buy-sell transaction, it
fails miserably-for both sides-in any situation
that requires a long-term working relationship.
That's why it's in your best interest to en
gage with your counterpart before negotia
tions start. Encourage the other party to do its
homework and consult with its internal stake
holders before and throughout the negotiation
process. Let the team know who you think the
key players are, who should be involved early
on, how you hope to build implementation
planning into the negotiation process, and
what key questions you are asking yourself.
Take the example of Equitas, a major rein
surer in the London market. When preparing
for commutations negotiations-whereby two
reinsurers settle their mutual book of busi
ness-the company sends its counterpart a
thorough kickoff package, which is used as the
agenda for the negotiation launch meeting.
This "commutations action pack" describes
how the reinsurer's own commutations depart
ment is organized, what its preferred approach
to a commutations negotiation is, and what
stages it follows. It also includes a suggested

"Leaving some money on
the table is OK ifyou
realize that the most
expensive deal is one that
fails."
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approach to policy reconciliation and due dili
gence and explains what data the reinsurer has
available-even acknowledging its imperfec
tions and gaps. The package describes critical
issues for the reinsurer and provides sample
agreements and memorandums for various
stages of the process.
The kickoff meeting thus offers a structured
environment in which the parties can educate
each other on their decision-making processes
and their expectations for the deal. The lan
guage of the commutations action pack and
the collaborative spirit of the kickoff meeting
are designed to help the parties get to know
each other and settle on a way of working to
gether before they start making the difficult
trade-offs that will be required of them. By es
tablishing an agreed-upon process for how and
when to communicate with brokers about the
deal, the two sides are better able to manage
the tension between the need to include stake
holders who are critical to implementation and
the need to maintain confidentiality before the
deal is signed.
Aventis Pharma is another example of how
measured disclosure of background and other
information can pave the way to smoother ne
gotiations and stronger implementation. Like
many of its peers, the British pharmaceutical
giant wants potential biotech partners to see it
as a partner of choice and value a relationship
with the company for more than the size of the
royalty check involved. To that end, Aventis
has developed and piloted a "negotiation
launch" process, which it describes as a meet
ing during which parties about to enter into
formal negotiations plan together for those ne
gotiations. Such collaboration allows both
sides to identify potential issues and set up an
agreed upon process and time line. The com
pany asserts that while "formally launching ne
gotiations with a counterpart may seem unor
thodox to some;' the entire negotiation process
runs more efficiently and effectively when
partners "take the time to discuss how they will
negotiate before beginning:'
3. Treat align ment as a shared responsibil
ity. If their interests are not aligned, and they
cannot deliver fully, that's not just their prob
lem-it's your problem, too.
Unfortunately, deal makers often rely on se
crecy to achieve their goals (after all, a stake
holder who doesn't know about a deal can't ob
ject). But leaving internal stakeholders in the
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dark about a potential deal can have negative
consequences. Individuals and departments
that will be directly affected don't have a
chance to weigh in with suggestions to miti
gate risks or improve the outcome. And people
with relevant information about the deal don't
share it, because they have no idea it's needed.
Instead, the typical reaction managers have
when confronted late in the game with news
of a deal that will affect their department is
"Not with my FfEs, you don't:'
Turning a blind eye to likely alignment
problems on the other side of the table is one
of the leading reasons alliances break down
and one of the major sources of conflict in out
sourcing deals. Many companies, for instance,
have outsourced some of their human resource
or finance and accounting processes. Service
providers, for their part, often move labor-in
tensive processes to Web-based self-service sys
tems to gain process efficiencies. If users find
the new self-service system frustrating or in
timidating, though, they make repeated (and
expensive) calls to service centers or fax in
handwritten forms. As a result, processing costs
jump from pennies per transaction to tens of
dollars per transaction.
But during the initial negotiation, buyers
routinely fail to disclose just how undisciplined
their processes are and how resistant to change
their cultures might be. After all, they think,
those problems will be the provider's headache
once the deal is signed. Meanwhile, to make
requested price concessions, providers often
drop line items from their proposals intended
to educate employees and support the new
process. In exchange for such concessions, with
a wink and a nod, negotiators assure the pro
vider that the buyers will dedicate internal re
sources to change-management and communi
cation efforts. No one asks whether business
unit managers support the deal or whether
function leaders are prepared to make the
transition from managing the actual work to
managing the relationship with an external
provider. Everyone simply agrees, the deal is
signed, and the frustration begins.
As managers and employees work around
the new self-service system, the provider's costs
increase, the service levels fall (because the
provider was not staffed for the high level of
calls and faxes), and customer satisfaction
plummets. Finger-pointing ensues, which must
then be addressed through expensive additions
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW • NOVEMBER 2004
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to the contract, costly modifications to pro
cesses and technology, and additional burdens
on a communication and change effort already
laden with baggage from the initial failure.
Building alignment is among negotiators'
least favorite activities. The deal makers often
feel as if they are wasting precious time "nego
tiating internally" instead of working their
magic on the other side. But without accep
tance of the deal by those who are essential to
its implementation (or who can place obstacles
in the way), proceeding with the deal is even
more wasteful. Alignment is a classic "pay me
now or pay me later" problem. To understand
whether the deal will work in practice, the ne
gotiation process must encompass not only
subject matter experts or those with bargain
ing authority but also those who will actually
have to take critical actions or refrain from
pursuing conflicting avenues later.
Because significant deals often require both
parties to preserve some degree of confidenti
ality, the matter of involving the right stake
holders at the right time is more effectively ad
dressed jointly than unilaterally. With an
understanding of who the different stakehold
ers are-including those who have necessary
information, those who hold critical budgets,
those who manage important third-party rela
tion.ships, and so on-a joint communications
subteam can then map how, when, and with
whom different inputs will be solicited and dif
ferent categories of information might be
shared. For example, some stakeholders may
need to know that the negotiations are taking
place but not the identity of the counterpart.
Others may need only to be aware that the or
ganization is seeking to form a partnership so
they can prepare for the potential effects of an
eventual deal. And while some must remain in
the dark, suitable proxies should be identified
to en.sure that their perspectives (and the roles
they will play during implementation) are con
sidered at the table.
4. Send one message. Complex deals re
quire the participation of many people during
implementation, so once the agreement is in
place, it's essential that the team that created
it get everyone up to speed on the terms of the
deal, on the mind-set under which it was nego
tiated, and on the trade-offs that were made in
crafting the final contract. When each imple
mentation team is given the contract in a vac
uum and then is left to interpret it separately,
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each develops a different picture of what the
deal is meant to accomplish, of the negotia
tors' intentions, and of what wasn't actually
written in the document but each had imag
ined would be true in practice.
"If your objective is to have a deal you can
implement, then you want the actual people
who will be there, after the negotiators move
on, up front and listening to the dialogue and
the give-and-take during the negotiation so
they understand how you got to the agreed so
lution;' says Steve Fenn, vice president for re
tail industry and former VP for global business
development at IBM Global Services. "But we
can't always have the delivery executive at the
table, and our customer doesn't always know
who from their side is going to be around to
lead the relation.ship:' To address this chal
lenge, Fenn uses joint hand-off meetings, at
which he and his counterpart brief both sides
of the delivery equation. "We tell them what's
in the contract, what is different or non.stand
ard, what the schedules cover. But more im
portant, we clarify the intent of the deal:
Here's what we had difficulty with, and here's
what we ended up with and why. We don't try
to reinterpret the language of the contract but
[ we do try] to discuss openly the spirit of the
contract:' These meetings are usually attended
by the individual who developed the statement
of work, the person who priced the deal, the
contracts and negotiation lead, and occasion
ally legal counsel. This team briefs the project
executive in charge of the implementation ef
fort and the executive's direct reports. Partici
pation on the customer side varies, because the
early days in an outsourcing relation.ship are
often hectic and full of turnover. But Fenn
works with the project executive and the sales
team to identify the key customer representa
tives who should be invited to the hand-off
briefing.
Negotiators who know they have to brief
the implementation team with their counter
parts after the deal is signed will approach the
entire negotiation differently. They'll start ask
ing the sort of tough questions at the negotiat
ing table that they imagine they'll have to field
during the postdeal briefings. And as they
think about how they will explain the deal to
the delivery team, they will begin to marshal
defensible precedents, norms, industry prac
tices, and objective criteria. Such standards of
legitimacy strengthen the relationship because
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they emphasize persuasion rather than coer
cion. Ultimately, this practice makes a deal
more viable because attention shifts from the
individual negotiators and their personalities
toward the merits of the arrangement.
5. Ma nage negotiation l i ke a busi ness pro
cess. Negotiating as if implementation mat

tered isn't a simple task. You must worry about
the costs and challenges of execution rather
than just getting the other side to say yes. You
must carry out all the internal consultations
necessary to build alignment. And you must
make sure your counterparts are as prepared as
you are. Each of these actions can feel like a big
time sink. Deal makers don't want to spend
time negotiating with their own people to build
alignment or risk having their counterparts
pull out once they know all the details. If a com
pany wants its negotiators to sign deals that cre
ate real value, though, it has to weed out that
deal maker mentality from its ranks. Fortu
nately, it can be done with simple processes and
controls. (For an example of how HP Services
structures its negotiation process, see the side-

bar "Negotiating Credibility?')
More and more outsourcing and procure
ment firms are adopting a disciplined negotia
tion preparation process. Some even require a
manager to review the output of that process
before authorizing the negotiator to proceed
with the deal. KLA-Tencor, a semiconductor
production equipment maker, uses the elec
tronic tools available through its supplier
management Web site for this purpose, for ex
ample. Its managers can capture valuable in
formation about negotiators' practices, in
cluding the issues they are coming up against,
the options they are proposing, the standards
of legitimacy they are relying on, and the
walkaway alternatives they are considering.
Coupled with simple postnegotiation re
views, this information can yield powerful or
ganizational insights.
Preparing for successful implementation is
hard work, and it has a lot less sizzle than the
brinksmanship characteristic of the negotia
tion process itself. To overcome the natural
tendency to ignore feasibility questions, it's im-

Negotiating Credibility
H P Services is g rowing in a h i g h ly com peti
tive m arket, and its success is pa rtly d u e to its
a pproach to negotiati ng l a rge outso u rc i ng
transactions. I n a maturing market, where
top tier providers ca n demonstrate com pa ra
ble ca pa b i l ities a n d where price va ri ations i n
evita bly d i m i n ish after com pan ies b i d
aga i n st one a n other t i m e a n d ti m e aga i n , a
provider's a b i l ity to manage a relatio n sh i p
a n d bu i l d trust a re key d i fferenti ators. The
negoti ation and the set of i nteractions lead
ing up to it give the customer a fi rst taste of
what it w i l l be l i ke to solve problems w ith the
provider d u r i n g the life of the contract. " De
c i s i o n s made by c l ients rega rd i ng selection
have as m uch to do with the com pa ny they
want to do bus i n ess with as with price, capa
b i l ity, and rel i a bi l ity;' acknowledges Steve
H u h n , H P Services' vice president of strate
g i c outso u rcing. " N egoti ati ng these k i n d s of
dea l s req u i res bei ng honest, open, a n d cred i
ble. I nteg rity is critical to our cred i b i l ity:'
H u h n's tea m of negoti ators u ses a wel l
structu red process designed to m a ke sure
that the p h i losop hy of i nteg rity i s pervasive
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throug hout the negotiation and not j ust a
fu nction of who happens to be at the ta ble o n
any g iven d ay. I t beg i ns w i t h the formation of
a negotiation tea m . Beca use transition i n
complex outso u rc i ng tran sactions represents
a period of h i g h vu l ne ra b i l ity, it is i m porta nt
to i nvolve i m plementatio n staff early on; that
way, a ny com m itments m ade ca n be va l i
dated by those who w i l l be responsi ble fo r
keepi ng them . A typica l negoti ation tea m
consists of a busi ness leader, or pu rsu it lead,
who is usua l ly responsi ble for develop i n g the
busi ness a n d structu r i n g the tra nsaction; a
contract specia l i st, who bri ngs experience
with outso u rc i ng contract terms and cond i
tions; and the p roposed cl ient ma nager, who
w i l l be respon s i ble fo r del ivery.
N egoti atio n leads work with a h ig h deg ree
of autonomy. H u h n bel i eves that a negotiato r
without a uthority is l ittle more tha n a mes
senger, and messengers a re u n l i kely to earn
trust or bu i ld working re lationsh i ps with
cou nterpa rts. At H P, negoti ators earn that a u
tonomy by prepari ng extensively w ith tem
plates and by revi ew i ng key deal parameters

with management. A n egotiator's mandate
does not just cover price: It also encom passes
m a rg i ns, cash fl ow, and RO I at d ifferent times
in the l ife of the contract; the treatment of
tra nsferred employees; the ways various
k i n d s of risk w i l l be a l located; a n d how the re
lationsh i p w i l l be governed. A l l these i nter
ests m ust be add ressed-both i n preparation
and at the negoti ation ta ble.
H P's outsourc i ng negoti ators a re subject
to i nforma l reviews with fu l l-ti m e deal
coaches as wel l as form a l m i lestone reviews.
The reviews, which a re desig ned to get key
sta keholders com m itted to i m plementation,
ha ppen before the form a l proposa l i s deliv
ered and before the deal i s signed.
The pu rsu it tea m leade rs a ren't fi n ished
o nce the agreement is s i g ned . In fact, they re
ta i n responsi b i l ity d u r i n g the tra n sition
phase and are considered " l i a ble" for the
dea l 's performa nce d u r i ng the n ext 18 to 24
months. That means negoti ators can't s i m ply
j u m p to the next a l l u r i ng deal. On the con
tra ry, they have a vested i nterest in making
sure the closed dea l actu a l ly meets its ta rgets.
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portant for management to send a clear mes
sage about the value of postdeal implementa
tion. It must reward individuals, at least in
part, based on the delivered success of the
deals they negotiate, not on how those deals
look on paper. This practice is fairly standard
among outsourcing service providers; it's one
that should be adopted more broadly.
Improving the implementability of deals
is not just about layering controls or captur
ing data. After all, a manager's strength has
much to do with the skills she chooses to
build and reward and the example she sets
with her own questions and actions. In the
health care arena, where payer-provider con
tentions are legion, forward-thinking payers
and innovative providers are among those
trying to change the dynamics of deals and
develop agreements that work better. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, for exam
ple, has been working to institutionalize an
approach to payer-provider negotiations that
strengthens the working relationship and
supports implementation. Training in collab
orative negotiation tools and techniques has
been rolled down from the senior executives
to the negotiators to the support and analy
sis teams. Even more important, those who
manage relationships with providers and are
responsible for implementing the agree
ments are given the same training and tools.
In other words, the entire process of putting
the deal together, making it work, and feed
ing the lessons learned through implementa
tion back into the negotiation process has
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been tightly integrated.
Most competitive runners will tell you that if
you train to get to the finish line, you will lose
the race. To win, you have to envision your
goal as just beyond the finish line so you will
blow right past it at full speed. The same is
true for a negotiator: If signing the document
is your ultimate goal, you will fall short of a
winning deal.
The product of a negotiation isn't a docu
ment; it's the value produced once the parties
have done what they agreed to do. Negotiators
who understand that prepare differently than
deal makers do. They don't ask, "What might
they be willing to accept?" but rather, "How do
we create value together?" They also negotiate
differently, recognizing that value comes not
from a signature but from real work per
formed long after the ink has dried.
1. For more perspectives on Concert's demise, see Margie
Semilof's 2001 article "Concert Plays Its Last Note" on Inter
netWeek.com; Brian Washburn's 2000 article "Discon
certed" on Tele.com; and Charles Hodson's 2001 article
"Concert: What Went Wrong?" on CNN.com.
2. See Alec Klein, "Lord of the Flies," the Washington Post,
June 15, 2003, and Gary Rivlin, "AOL's Rough Riders;' Indus
try Standard, October 30, 2000, for more information on
the AOL Business Affairs department's practices.
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pursue the risks and rewards of mutually compat
ible goals that would be difficult to achieve alone.
Alliances include outsourcing partnerships, j oint
operating agreements, and joint ventures. These
alliances provide the companies with access to
new markets, capabilities, knowledge, and capital,
along with the ability to share development and
acquisition costs. Alliances also enable each party
to bring products to market quickly in a cost-effec
tive manner, which is critical in today's healthcare
industry.
BCBSF's Alliance Group is experiencing positive
outcomes by applying concepts outlined in Getting
to Yes and is helping to move the organization
more toward the management concepts of prin
cipled negotiation. Historically, however, busi
nesses have not formally practiced or rewarded
employees for these types of behaviors. For exam
ple, contract negotiations between companies of
ten focus on each individual organization champi
oning its own positions without considering the
other's interests . Rewards are often linked to how
well an organization's position is defended or
"won" without giving thought to what bigger solu
tions could emerge by focusing on mutual gains.

Never before has there been a more opportune time
for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.
(BCBSF) to benefit from the concepts of principled
negotiation outlined in the book Getting to Yes.
BCBSF is the industry leader in Florida, provid
ing health benefit plans and health-related ser
vices. The company and its subsidiaries serve
more than six million people. However, maintain
ing a market leadership position is difficult in light
of the many challenges facing today's healthcare
marketplace.
Factors such as rising healthcare costs, in
creased competition, consumerism, and shifting
demographics have caused the company to search
for new and different ways of doing business as
customers' healthcare needs expand. Inherent in
these new and different business models is the
need for more collaborative business practices,
such as those outlined in Getting to Yes.

Different Times Call for Different Approaches
Today's healthcare marketplace is becoming in
creasingly consumer driven. Consumers expect
the same level of service and convenience from
health organizations that they receive from other
companies, such as online retailers, banks, and
investment firms. The Institute of the Future pre
dicts that by the end of 20 1 0 , the health market will
be an innovative economy demanding nontradi
tional offerings such as wellness , food, cosmetics,
fashion, health information and even biosecurity. 1
Developing alliances with other organizations is
one way the company is positioning itself for the
health industry of the future. BCBSF's Alliance
Group, a small department formed in 200 1 , enables
business areas to develop strategic relationships
with other entities.
Capitalizing on business opportunities through
alliances enables BCBSF and other companies to

Con tract negotiations between
companies often focus on each individual
organization championing i ts own
posi tions wi th o u t considering the other's
in terests.
To expand beyond this type of traditional mind
set , BCBSF is seeking out ways to indoctrinate the
concepts of principled negotiation throughout the
entire organization. Principled negotiation, accord
ing to Getting to Yes, involves looking at issues
based on their merits rather than defending stead109
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fast positions. Its goal is to meet the underlying
concerns of the parties. Shifting behavior away
from a contest of wills toward this type of collab
orative m indset can be challenging. To help make
the transition, BCBSF is emphasizing three major
steps: top-level executive support; a disciplined,
programmed approach to alliance management;
and reinforcement of desired behaviors and re
lated outcomes.
BCBSF is further embracing the concepts of prin
cipled negotiation by working with Vantage Part
ners, a consulting firm that partners with leading
companies to institutionalize the capability to ne
gotiate, build, and manage critical relationships
effectively. Initially, BCBSF was seeking external
perspectives for establishing superior alliance
management capabilities. As part of that process,
the company was introduced t o mutual-gains be
havior as a necessary component of developing
successful alliances and other collaborative rela
t ionships . Vantage, founded by Getting to Yes co
author Roger Fisher, helps its clients incorporate
concepts from the book into their daily m anage
ment practices. BCBSF has been working with
Vantage Partners for approximately two years and
has experienced increased trust and alignment
with business associates as a result of implement
ing Getting to Yes concepts.
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workflow and improves communication between
physicians, hospitals, payers, and pharmacies.
Through a secure website, physicians can submit
requests for payments, check the status of pay
ments for services, verify patients' coverage and
eligibility, and receive authorizations for referrals
and other medical services online. This stream
lined process replaces time-consuming manual in
teractions such as phone calls and paperwork.
Currently, there are more than 9,000 physician of
fices, 208 hospitals, and more than 27,000 physi
cians in Florida using the Availity platform to pro
cess routine transactions.
The challenges of m anaging a joint venture with
a key competitor could be daunting, if not impos
sible, without a shift in behavior by both parties to
think of the other as a partner. Adding t o the com
plexity is the organizations' differing corporate
cultures, due in part to their structures: Humana is
a for-profit publicly traded company, while BCBSF
is a private, not-for-profit policyholder-owned mu
tual company. In addition, Humana serves a na
tional market . while BCBSF primarily serves Flor
ida. The change in m indset to be collaborative vs.
competitive in the development of this solution
was critical to the formation and ongoing success
of the joint venture.

Separating the People from the Problem
Putting the Concepts into Practice
On a daily basis , BCBSF is learning first hand
about the benefits of applying principled negotia
tion concepts in its alliances, as well as the pitfalls
of what happens when the concepts are not ap
plied consistently.
The company's movement toward applying Get
ting to Yes concepts is illustrated by the formation
and management of a strategic alliance with a key
competitor. Availity, L.L. C . , a joint venture between
subsidiaries of BCBSF and Humana, Inc., was con
ceived out of a desire to lower health costs , im
prove efficiencies, and provide more t imely service
to physicians and hospitals. Humana is one of the
nation's leading publicly traded health benefits
companies, with approximately seven m illion
medical members in 1 9 states and Puerto Rico. The
company offers coordinated health insurance cov
erage and related services to employer groups,
government-sponsored plans, and individuals.
Both Humana and BCBSF were trying to reach the
same goal of improving the manner in which hos
pitals and physicians conducted business with
their organizations.
The resulting j oint venture, Availity, is an Inter
net-based solution that streamlines administrative

Although BCBSF had not yet institutionalized Get
ting to Yes concepts during the early formation of
Availity, the company became more deliberate in
following the concepts after the alliance was op
erational and the organization became more
aware of the benefits of principled negotiation.
Looking back, despite a lack of formal training in
Getting to Yes concepts, the company uncon
sciously implemented some of the concepts during
the formation of Availity, which helped greatly in
building the alliance.
As outlined in the book. separating the people
from the problem requires emphasizing relation
ships by dealing directly with perceptions. BCBSF
looked for ways to demonstrate its desire to collab
orate by coming to the table with a sincere intent to
build a relationship and determine common inter
ests. Although it was not formally stated that the
concepts of principled negotiation would be fol
lowed, the negotiators realized that forming a suc
cessful joint venture would require a collaborative
approach. Both parties approached initial discus
sions in an open manner by listening rather than
trying to debate or persuade. The two parties in
vested substantial amounts of time at the execu
tive level to build the relationship. As the book
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says, prevention works best-and building this
type of personal relationship "cushioned the peo
ple on each side against the knocks of negotia
tion." A strong relationship at the senior level
continues to benefit the alliance today through
subsequent governance activities.
Once Availity was established and operational,
BCBSF began to interact with Availity as a busi
ness assoc iate. This new relationship benefited
from additional collaborative negotiation skills.
A significant challenge in implementing the con
cept of separating the people from the problem
was the complex nature of the multiple relation
ships inherent in the Availity alliance. On the sur
face, it seemed as though only one relationship
existed: the two initial owners. A closer look re
vealed several different relationships between
BCBSF and Availity, ranging from BCBSF having
an ownership interest in Availity, to BCBSF being
the largest customer of Availity, to BCBSF being a
vendor for Availity for technical development. Sim
ilarly, Humana has multiple relationships with
Availity.
Many of the people involved in the formation
had multiple accountabilities reflecting different
aspects of the relationship. These multiple rela
tionships and their corresponding accountabilities
made it difficult to understand a person's perspec
tive on a given issue. By mapping out the different
relationships and corresponding accountabilities,
ambiguity was reduced and problem-solving im
proved. The exercise helped the parties under
stand the various perspectives and clarified ac
countabilities. Mapping out accountabilities in
alliances is an approach that BCBSF is adopting
which is starting to result in more favorable out
comes in learning to separate people from prob
lems. In addition, when individuals have several
roles, the organization is learning the value of hav
ing those individuals clearly communicate which
role they are representing.

the other's viewpoints.
One challenge in focusing on interests rather
than positions had to do with the two organizations
having different approaches to testing the various
capabilities of Availity. One party was accus
tomed to using a prescribed methodology for test
ing the various capabilities. The other, being a
new organization, had processes that were still
under development. The "positions" had to do with
which organization's testing procedures to follow,
but the underlying interests for both part ies were
identical: for Availity to be up and running error
free.
After holding a number of brainstorming ses
sions, it became evident that the parties could
combine components of their methodologies to cre
ate a joint solution. By focusing on interests rather
than positions, the parties realized that testing did
not have to follow a certain methodology; it just
had to result in error-free operations. By shifting
the focus to interests rather than the positions, a
new solution involving leveraging existing re
sources in a more effective manner was designed.
A j oint testing approach was agreed upon to meet
mutual interests, and the part ies were able to
learn from each other in creating the solution.

Focus on Interests, Not Posi tions

Getting to Yes says, "Skill at in ven ting
op tions can be one of your m ost useful
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Booth and McCredie

During initial discussions, Humana and BCBSF
laid the groundwork to understand each other and
see the situation from the other's perspective. Gen
eral discussions about how each party viewed the
industry, the future of healthcare, opportunities for
collaboration, and anticipated future challenges
helped both parties to identify and understand the
other's interests regarding electronic connectivity.
At later stages, for example, during the testing
phase, this exercise served as a strong foundation
in helping the parties to separate people from
problems because there was an understanding of

lll

Inventing Options for Mutual Gain
Getting to Yes says, "Skill at inventing options can
be one of your most useful assets." This was espe
cially evident in the formation of Availity. Before
Availity was conceived, Humana and BCBSF came
together and identified their interests regarding
electronic connectivity. Both parties wanted to im
prove relationships with hospitals and physicians,
reduce healthcare industry costs for consumers,
and improve workflow for hospitals, physicians,
and payers. The solution resulted in the joint ven
ture that became Availity, which mutually bene
fited both organizations.

assets. "
To assure that options for mutual gain were be
ing sought throughout the development of Availity,
relationship manager responsibilities were as
signed to individuals to keep the best interests of
the alliance in the forefront. Each party had some
one who functioned in this capacity, which helped
with the overall success of the alliance. Relation
ship manager roles are now included in many of
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BCBSF's alliances to serve as objective arbitrators
between the parties and to look for options for
mutual gain.

Additional Lessons Learned
BCBSF has learned a number of lessons about how
to develop collaborative and productive alliance
relationships.
In general, the company's experience has been
that applying the concepts from Getting to Yes
came more naturally at the executive/strategic
level and required much more deliberation at sub
sequent levels. When alliance parties moved away
from the conceptual level and into daily opera
tions, implementing Getting to Yes concepts be
came more challenging. There are several reasons
for this, including the experience levels of those
involved, challenges with establishing strategic
alignment throughout all levels, and varying re
ward systems at different levels of t he organiza
tion. Among the steps t hat BCBSF is taking to ad
dress these challenges are: establishing alliance
specialists at the middle-management level, and
providing training regarding principled negotia
tion concepts at all levels of the organization.

Applying the concepts from Getting to
Yes came more naturally at the
executive/strategic level and required
much more deliberation at subsequen t
levels.
Many of the lessons learned involve setting clear
expectations in the beginning of the alliance for
mation. One is the importance of being deliberate
in establishing ground rules for interacting with
others early in the relationship before negotiation
begins. Agreed-upon methods for communicating,
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making decisions, and handling conflicts, al
though somewhat awkward to create, are critical
in relationship building and can help the parties to
separate people from problems , especially when
conflicts arise and emotions are high.
Along the same lines, a documented business
plan that defines the market opportunity, product
or service, sales and promotion approach, and val
idates financial forecasts can prove beneficial.
The business plan is not only an effective tool for
guiding the alliance; it also clarifies the interests
and expectations of the parties.
In addition to a business plan, the alliance par
ties have found benefits in clearly defined strate
gies with support ing organizational goals. In ad
dition, the company is establishing metrics that
measure not only the business results of alliances
but the quality and strength of the relationships as
well.
Establishing early on what each party will con
tribute in terms of capital, resources, and revenue
is also a lesson that the company has learned in
forming successful alliances. Without this founda
tion, the parties may have differing viewpoints of
what the other is contributing, which often leads to
misunderstanding and can prevent the alliance
from progressing smoothly.
Perhaps the biggest reward for implementing
the concepts from Getting to Yes is being able to
see first hand the benefits-meeting business
goals, spending less time defending positions, cre
ating a less stressful business environment , and
meeting the underlying interests of both parties.
The concepts have helped the company discover
new ways of doing business- opening a new
world of possibilities never imagined before.

Endnote
1 The Emerging Health Economy: A Special Report. SR-787 B.
2003. Menlo Park, CA: Institute for the Future.
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